Hamburgisches
WeltWirtschafts
Institut

Egyptian, Afghan, and Serbian diaspora communities in Germany: How do they contribute to their country of origin?

Tatjana Baraulina, Michael Bommes, Tanja El-Cherkeh,
Heike Daume, Florin Vadean

HWWI Research
Paper 3-5
by the
HWWI Research Programme
Migration – Migration Research Group

Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) | 2007
ISSN 1861-504X

The study was commissioned by the Economic Development and Employment Division of the German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit /GTZ).

Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)
Migration – Migration Research Group (MRG)
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 | 20354 Hamburg | Germany
Phone +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 50 | Fax +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 76
el-cherkeh@hwwi.org

Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS)
University of Osnabrück
Neuer Graben 19/21 | 49069 Osnabrück | Germany
Phone +49 (0)541 969 4384 | Fax +49 (0)541 969 4380
imis@uni-osnabrueck.de

HWWI Research Paper
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 | 20354 Hamburg | Germany
Phone +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 0 | Fax +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 76
info@hwwi.org | www.hwwi.org
ISSN 1861-504X

Preface

The initiative for the present study was taken at a GTZ conference in May 2004 on "Co-operation with the Diaspora". The contributions made at this conference were a clear reflection of the great importance which the diverse economic and social activities of Diaspora communities have on the development of their countries of origin and, moreover, on building bridges between different societies. Hence, one important recommendation of the conference was to further enhance this positive impact and make use of it in a more targeted manner so as to formulate and implement joint projects within the framework of international co-operation.

Against this background, GTZ had commissioned a comprehensive study in 2005 on exploring and evaluating the activities of three selected Diaspora communities – the Egyptian, the Afghan and the Serbian Diaspora. The Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück and the Migration Research Group (MRG) of the Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) and the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) were enlisted to carry out the research. Starting point of the investigations was to examine the respective different migration movements and existing forms of organisation of the Diaspora in Germany. The key issue was to investigate the development contributions which the respective communities have been making to date, and what can be done to link these useful activities to official development cooperation, thereby better exhausting the potential of Diaspora communities.

The results of the study now available contain three major key messages for GTZ and, in turn, serve as starting points for concrete joint projects to be implemented together with the Diaspora within the scope of the new sector project "Migration and Development":

1. With their comprehensive interview material and on a well-founded scientific basis, the authors of the study produce evidence of the actually existing potential of the Diaspora, knowledge of which so far had been somewhat vague and based on isolated information only.
2. Good integration of the migrants in their host country has a positive impact also on their activities in the country of origin. Integration and transnational activities therefore are not – as it is sometimes stated - contradictory; and
3. Diaspora activities and development cooperation concepts show a great deal of similarities and thus offer a good foundation for future joint projects.

Dr. Hans Werner Mundt Dr. Irina Kausch

Contents

Summary ... **iii**

1. Introduction ... **1**

2. Description of the Diaspora Communities ... **5**

2.1. The Egyptian Diaspora in Germany ... 5
2.1.1. Egyptian Student Migrants: The Rotary Clubs ... 5
2.1.2. Egyptian Marital Immigrants, Refugees and Irregular Immigrants: Weakly Organised Networks ... 7
2.2. The Afghan Diaspora in Germany ... 8
2.2.1. Structure, Distribution and Immigration Phases ... 8
2.2.2. Residence Status, Educational Background and Vocational Qualifications ... 11
2.2.3. Social Interaction and Forms of Organisation ... 13
2.3. The Serbian Diaspora in Germany ... 15
2.3.1. The Guest Workers: Serbian Clubs ... 15
2.3.2. Serbian Intellectuals and Student Immigrants: The Political Mobilisation of the Elite ... 18

3. Diaspora Activities and Their Significance for Developmental Policy ... **20**

3.1. Economic Activities of the Diaspora ... 20
3.1.1. Remittances ... 20
3.1.2. Direct Investments ... 23
3.1.3. Foreign Trade ... 25
3.2. Activities Related to Infrastructure Development ... 27
3.2.1. Egypt ... 27
3.2.2. Afghanistan ... 29
3.2.3. Serbia ... 32
3.2.4. Case Comparison ... 33
3.3. Political Participation of the Migrant in the Countries of Origin ... 39
3.3.1. Egypt ... 39
3.3.2. Serbia ... 42
3.3.3. Case Comparison ... 46

4. Conclusions and Recommendations ... **48**

4.1. Conclusions ... 48
4.2. Recommended Action ... 51

References ... **56**

Summary

In recent academic and political discussions, the contribution of Diaspora communities to development in their countries of origin has been recognised. There is, however, a considerable need for knowledge about (a) the types and patterns of economic, social and cultural transfer between the Diaspora and the countries of origin, (b) the social, economic and political conditions for the establishment or the obstruction of such transfers, as well as (c) the requirements of policies that attempt to constructively support such efforts and exploit them for developmental policy objectives. Considering the example of the Afghan, Egyptian and Serbian Diaspora communities in Germany, the goal of this pilot study is to develop and test an explorative research heuristic that measures the dimensions relevant for investigating that contribution. This report primarily offers empirical, exemplary (not representative) insights into this issue.

This study was carried out by the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück, together with the Migration Research Group (MRG) of the Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) as well as the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI). It primarily relies on about 80 guiding interviews, conducted in numerous cities in Germany with “key figures” of the three communities. Some of the interviews were also carried out in Belgrade, Serbia as well as Cairo, Egypt. (Given budgetary limitations and security concerns, no interviews were carried out in Afghanistan.) In addition, the study is based on the evaluation both of academic research and of diverse documents from national bodies and international organisations.

Results of the Study

The following conditions lay the foundation for our analysis: (a) the migrants themselves, i.e. their human capital, (b) the reason for their migration (labour, education, flight, family/marriage), (c) the social conditions in the receiving countries and their social integration there, (d) the social conditions in the country of origin and the position of the migrants or their families there, as well as (e) the social forms of organisation of migrants in their receiving country (the structure of the Diaspora).

The variables of this frame of reference occur in different combinations in the different Diaspora communities, as is shown in the communities we investigate in Germany:

Egypt

Migration from Egypt, which began in the 1950s, has primarily involved students from the upper-middle-class elite. A larger percentage of Egyptians are among the educated professional labour force; they have high quotas of naturalisation and of Germany-Egyptian marriages, and they are well-integrated. Highly qualified migrants of Egyptian origin are usually organised in professional associations or Egyptian culture clubs. Like Rotary Clubs, these associations serve to reproduce, stabilise and strengthen their own elite networks. In comparison to the other two countries we have studied, Egypt has relatively stable political and economic conditions, combined with numerous possibilities for profitable investments. Many Egyptians take advantage of these opportunities; we thus find a number of profit-oriented investments, as well as individually initiated, profit-oriented activity beneficial to the common good. Much of this is in the prestigious areas of education and science.

Afghanistan

The first Afghan migrants, in the 1950s, were predominantly students and businessmen, in particular, carpet dealers. With the beginning of the war in 1979 and in wake of the numerous shifts in political power that followed, the refugees to Germany have been those with access to the resources necessary for the escape route. Initially, it was above all members of the western-oriented educated elite who sought asylum in Germany. However, after the mujahideen assumed power, members of the communist party also came. The Taliban regime released another wave of refugees, this time largely of the urban middle class and rural ethnic and religious minorities. As a result of the different motivations and the social diffusion of the immigrants from Afghanistan, the Afghan Diaspora is very heterogeneous.

Later waves of refugees were, and are, usually confronted with considerable difficulties integrating into Germany. These result from residence-status and labour-market restrictions, limiting the types of activities allowed them. However, second generation Afghan immigrants have increasingly become well-integrated into the German education system.

Individual involvement in Afghanistan (e.g. through remittances to the country of origin and individual investments) and, above all, collective involvement (through numerous activities organised by associations) began with the outbreak of the war in 1979. These have intensified to today. In the wake of the NATO development, after 2001 involvement became particularly strong. Through a war that has spanned over two decades, a major portion of the physical and social infrastructure has been destroyed. The new Afghan state is not (yet) able to provide the public goods necessary to normalise social life. Thus the involvement of the Diaspora in infrastructure projects in the areas of education, healthcare, science, girls' and women's advancement, humanitarian relief, transportation, and energy and water provision aims to compensate for the failings of the state. The increased involvement of the Diaspora in Afghanistan has undoubtedly been stimulated by the international attention (in particular directly after the NATO deployment). In this context, it has been possible to mobilise the financial and political resources of national and international donors, as well as actors such as NGOs, and at times to create synergies with the projects of the Diaspora.

Serbia

The immigration of Serbians to Germany – initially from Yugoslavia – began in the 1960s with the guest worker agreements and followed on this basis until the recruitment stop in 1973. The qualification structure of the migrants included both skilled and unskilled labourers; however, a larger number of less qualified workers returned to Serbia (Yugoslavia) after the recruitment stop. This was then followed by the immigration of Serbians to Germany largely for purposes of family reunification. Besides the guest workers, a small but steady number of Serbian intellectuals had immigrated since as early as the 1950s; these were mostly opponents of the communist regime.

Yugoslavians and, later, Serbians organised in clubs (often culture or sport clubs), which were essentially directed towards the life of Serbian migrants in Germany. With the increase in ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and the eventual collapse of the country, there was a rise in the national consciousness of the Serbians living in Germany; and in the place of the earlier Yugoslavian clubs, Serbian clubs were founded.

Already prior to the conflict in Yugoslavia, individual investments in Yugoslavia, especially in real estate, were the focus of the Serbian migrants' activities there. In contrast to the Egyp-

tians and the Afghans, they were not much involved in infrastructure development projects. This was different during the war that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and during the Kosovo conflict. At that time, similarly to the Afghans, if less comprehensively, the Serbian Diaspora was involved with its country of origin for patriotic reasons. In an attempt to compensate for the state, which was tied up in the war, they thus were involved in diverse projects in the areas of healthcare, water provision, transportation and humanitarian relief.

The difference from the Afghans' involvement consists in the fact that this involvement aimed to support the weakened state. The state, however, was still able to win over the migrants and mobilise their patriotism. By contrast, the activities of the Afghans were influenced by the much severer breakdown of the state of Afghanistan; as a result, their work is not even directed towards state activities. In contrast to that, the Serbians in Germany were publicly involved in trying to correct a view of the Serbian state in the international media, which they thought to be one-sided. There have only recently been renewed efforts, through the Serbian Ministry of Diaspora (founded in 2005), to reactivate the economic and political potential of the Serbian Diaspora. This indicates a stark contrast between the Serbians' situation and that of the other migrant groups studied here: namely, the forms of organisation, as well as the political orientation and involvement of the Serbian migrants, are strongly determined by the political developments in their country of origin.

Recommended Action

The cases we have studied clearly show that in order to be able to recognise where developmental policy assistance might be applied, a precise case-by-case analysis is needed. This should be directed (a) at the points of conjuncture of the different frameworks at different points of time, and (b) at their combined effect on the mobilisation of the Diaspora communities. On the basis of this, action can be recommended in different areas:

A) the promotion of economic activities,

B) the promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure,

C) the promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora,

D) the promotion of the existing Diaspora structures,

E) the development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country, as well as

F) international collaboration.

A) The promotion of economic activities

- The promotion of the *export extensions*. This can occur by supporting the development of EU-compatible product standards, in particular in Egypt and Serbia.
- Support in developing the *energy sector*. This offers the greatest prospects for the success of a number of existing and planned infrastructure and economic activities in Afghanistan.
- The promotion of the *agriculture sector* in Afghanistan. Here co-operation is possible between German developmental co-operation agencies and Afghan agricultural engineers living in Germany who have already carried out studies on revitalising the agriculture sector.
- A focus on the *activities in rural areas* of Afghanistan. This is desirable because many foreign NGOs are mainly active in Kabul. Given their specific knowledge of their home-

land, Afghan Diaspora organisations appear to be more apt to assume the risks associated with establishing projects in rural areas.

B) The promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure

- *Fellowship programs* could open the *German University in Cairo* and similar institutions to all those who may be interested.
- In Afghanistan such projects would require support for the *reconstruction and development of the educational sector*. The greatest need is for support in *qualifying teaching personnel*.
- In the area of *healthcare provision, qualified personnel* is also needed in Afghanistan. Here, for example, fellowships for the further education or specialist education of medical doctors could help, as well as exchanges at international congresses.
- In general, it is to be noted that the *exchange and transfer of knowledge* in the areas of education, research, healthcare, or in other areas, would be desirable for all three countries. This can take place at various levels (for students, instructors or professors).

C) The promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora

- Our analysis shows that the Serbians have a strong political interest in their homeland. However, despite the fact that they had the legal rights to take part in the 2004 *election*, the majority of Serbians in Germany did not do so because of the significant effort it required. Here, bilateral support for the Serbian government in developing an efficient election procedure should be considered (e.g. through absentee mail ballots and so on).

D) The promotion of the existing Diaspora structures

- *Promotion of reciprocal contacts* between government agencies in Egypt and the Egyptian Diaspora in Germany.
- The *quasi-return*, mostly of successful businessmen from the Egyptian Diaspora, can be used to multiply the knowledge of the forms of involvement, as well as the possibilities and prospects they entail.
- In the Diaspora, there are individual actors who are interested, competent and *committed,* but who *do not have access to the necessary financial resources*. Here, too, it would be possible to provide support.
- Strong *fractions within the Diaspora* – in particular in the Afghan Diaspora – hamper effective involvement relevant for development. The activities are often not bundled where it appears sensible for them to be. A *co-ordination site* to organise the exchanges of and links between ongoing work and projects could serve as a corrective.
- Beyond that, it would be desirable to increase the *professionalisation of Diaspora projects* (e.g. through country-specific seminars on fund raising for Afghanistan and Serbia, etc.).
- Special attention should be paid to second generation immigrants who take a special interest in their country of origin and thus might be able to serve as intercultural intermediaries. This is true for all three countries.
- A strong *interest* was shown *in further information about the structure of the Diaspora* itself, the breadth of it, and the various activities in the countries of origin that are based

in it. An *information centre* could provide data on possibilities for involvement (possibilities for assistance, the focus of investments, etc.). Beyond that, information on involvement and successful projects would facilitate organisations' *evaluation of their own work* and could also serve as something of an *exchange for best practices*.

E) The development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country

In principle, the migrants who contribute the most to the development of their countries of origin are those who, on the basis of *a permanent residence permit* and the *equal opportunity to access the labour market*, have acquired a good social standing in the receiving country and are thus well-integrated there.

- A *higher level of integration*, as well as good social standing, contributes to the activity of Diaspora members. The potentials of migration can only be developed if all three parties are benefited – first the migrants, then the receiving country (through their integration), and finally, on this basis, the country of origin. The integration of migrants would thus promote "brain circulation".
- In this context, allowing *double citizenship* is also important. The loss of citizenship in the country of origin may be accompanied by the loss of voting rights and the loss of the right to acquire real estate. It may also entail a visa requirement for later entry into the country. Allowing double citizenship thus may be one fitting strategy to support the involvement of immigrants living in Germany in the development of their countries of origin.

As a consequence, a migration and integration policy with the objective of promoting the social integration of the migrants will at the same time promote the Diaspora migrants in their involvement with their countries of origin. Such a migration policy, which includes a comprehensive integration policy, is simultaneously a good developmental policy. It *taps the resources of those concerned* and attempts to mobilise them for development. In this context, it is significant to note our impression that many migrants in the Diaspora communities (and their networks) possess specific and valuable knowledge that ought to be taken account of in drafting future developmental policy strategies. Thus, it would be valuable to reflect on the ways in which representatives of the Diaspora communities might be integrated into developmental policy bodies as advisors.

F) International co-operation

- Through *remittances*, members of the Diaspora have a significant impact on their countries of origin. The issue is not only debated extensively at the national level, but also at the international level. As many international organisations have advocated, it is important to develop transparent and cheaper systems for remittances.
- In addition, an *international (or bilateral) exchange* among receiving countries of larger Diaspora communities is worth considering. Beyond that, reflections on the potentials connected with assisting the *international networking of the respective Diaspora* could be more fully integrated into bilateral or international discussion.

.

1. Introduction

The interest in the contribution of Diaspora communities to the development in their countries of origin results from the insight that, in the course of their migration experience, migrants remain involved in different social relationships both in the region they have departed from and in the region they have migrated to. In this, migration is understood as a process that remains significant for various aspects of life across generations. From the developmental perspective, precisely this accounts, in various ways, for the relevance of migrants for their countries of origin.

Objectives of this Study

On the basis of empirical evidence, it is presumed that various general conditions have a significant impact on the character of migrants' relationships to their countries of origin. Viewed systematically, these concern:

- the migrants themselves (their human capital),
- the reasons for their migration (work, education, flight, family/marriage),
- the social conditions in the receiving country and the social integration existing there,
- the social conditions in the country of origin and the position of the migrants or their families there,
- the social forms of organisation (structure of the Diaspora).

These conditions map out the frame of reference that served as the basis for this study. One main objective of this study was to develop concrete questions and a suitable research design for dealing with the question of the effect of migration on development. This is necessary given the lack of clarity in the discussion of the contexts and causes and effects at play here.

The contributions of the various communities to the development in their countries of origin ought to make it possible to concretely investigate these matters and thus to develop a realistic assessment of them.

Methodology and Structure of the Study

This study primarily relies on about 80 guiding interviews carried out with Egyptian, Afghan and Serbian migrants who – through procured addresses, Internet searches and snowball effects – were identified as key figures, leaders of central organisations and persons responsible for transfer activities in the communities, or well-known representatives of their respective migrant groups. In this, the interviews with Egyptian migrants were carried out in Frankfurt, Munich and Berlin; those with Afghans were carried out in Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne, Bonn, Bochum, Detmold, Hagen, Freiburg and Karlsruhe; those with Serbians were carried out in Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg, Bonn and Bielefeld.

Studies on the number of migrants and the habitation of the migrant groups under investigation have shown that leaders of active organisations, or a larger percentage of the migrant populations, live in these cities. The possibility of gaining access to them there thus seemed certain. This study makes no claims to being representative. The following were core objectives of the interviews:

- to make transfer routes and contexts accessible about which no or little knowledge yet exists, but only conjectures – for example, the Deutsche *Bundesbank's* unpublished data on payment statistics does not allow conclusions to be drawn about remittance transfer flows;
- to gain insights into the costs of monetary transfers, the forms and structures of transfer channels, the stability and reliability of the banking industry, the state finance policy, as well as practical transfer agents;
- to find out which social bonds establish or obstruct lasting commitments to social, political and cultural transfer activities and to the participation in public or private projects in the country of origin.

Care was taken to ensure that the questionnaires included the dimensions differentiated in the frame of reference under question (characteristics of migrants, reasons for migration, social integration and involvement, social forms of organisation, conditions in the country of origin).

Beyond evaluating the interviews, the subsequent report also evaluates other materials. In particular, these include various documents (academic articles and research reports; documents from national sites, such as the *Deutsche Bundesbank*, as well as international organisations, such as the World Bank, the Global Commission on International Migration, the International Monetary Fund, the International Organization for Migration, etc.), websites, brochures, annual reports of organisations and associations, as well as statistics (i.e. from the German Office for Refugees and Migration, the German Federal Statistical Office, and visa statistics from the German Federal Foreign Office, etc.).

Beyond that, within the framework of the study, interviews were carried out in Egypt and Serbia with representatives of their governments and political administrations, companies, banks, business chambers, universities and schools, as well as with migrants who had returned to their countries of origin and representatives of German organisations such as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Chamber of Commerce, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), as well as the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). This has provided insight into the ways in which the activities and their effects on the countries of origin are registered and judged there, particularly from the vantage point of the political and economic organisations. Given the time limitations and the limited financial resources of this study, we have refrained from carrying out a similar investigation in Afghanistan.

In what follows, the results of the evaluation of the collected materials will be presented with a view to the outlined frame of reference. First, an overview is offered of the three investigated migrant groups in Germany, as well as the individual country studies (Section 2). In that section the various immigration histories and forms of immigration for the three groups are presented. The type of migration (labour migration, forced political migration, student migration or family reunification) characteristic for the groups under study are explicated, for these have proven to be relevant for the relationship to the regions of origin and the type of transfer activity engaged in. Then the social integration of the three groups are taken up – to the degree possible, particularly their legal residence status, their integration into the labour market, their employment status levels, their level of education and vocational training, their income and family status. As is to be demonstrated in what follows, the social integration of the migrants in the immigration context – the differing levels of access, in particular to mone-

tary, vocational/professional and political resources – is decisive for their capacity to engage in lasting, sustainable transfer activities. Then the various forms of engagement and the activities of the migrants in their countries of origin are addressed (Section 3): An overview of their economic transactions is offered. Specifically the focus of these activities is examined, along with the conditions under which they take place and their significance for the development of the infrastructure in the countries of origin and for their political involvement. These results are always presented in comparative perspective.

We then look into the forms of organisation of the migrant groups under study and inquire into their significance for mobilising migrants to address problems in their regions of origin and countries of origin and their willingness to get involved economically, socially or politically. Although we do not claim that the results are representative, on the basis of our research and interviews, we do believe that we have covered organisations relevant for the migrant groups investigated here.

For clarification, a methodological comment is to be made here: In carrying out our study, we did not presume the existence of Egyptian, Serbian or Afghan Diaspora or communities. The latter two concepts entail strong assumptions about social constellations valid among migrants.[1] We do not presume these here, but do, where fitting, indicate their relevance for the issues being investigated. Beyond that, the general concepts have an inherent tendency towards homogenisation, while in reality there is a sizeable social heterogeneity even among migrants from a single country of origin. Our inquiry is concerned with the detailed effects of immigrants on their regions of origin. This is based on the assumption that, in the course of migration projects that span numerous generations, migrants remain integrated in transnational social relationships of an economic, legal, political, familial and cultural nature, which include both the region of origin and the target region. Against this background, the self-organisations of the migrants provide a good starting point for this study: On the one hand, they serve as empirically accessible addresses for gathering information. On the other hand, in contrast to formal organisations, the capacity of these organisations to act is dependent on the motives of the organisations' members, and the more or less successful mobilisation of those members.[2] In this context, the degree to which the mobilisation is structured by the members' motives – be they ethnic or national, or communal (*vergemeinschaftend*) or social (*vergesellschaftend*) (Weber, 1972) – becomes apparent. In addition, the type of issue – economic, political, social or cultural – that the organisations focus on becomes significant.

Economic transactions here include, first of all, money flows, which are interpreted with no further differentiation as remittances. However, other transactions are to be distinguished: for example, those in which migrants make income available to their remaining family (other others) and investment transactions oriented towards making a profit. Beyond that, economic transactions include import and export business with the country of origin. Activities *oriented towards the social infrastructure* are those that in one way or another are oriented towards the problem of providing common goods, in particular, in the areas of education, healthcare, transportation or science. Here it is to be taken into account that, in countries where goods such as education, science or healthcare are primarily, or, in part, provided by the market, migrants can become active as entrepreneurs in these areas. That differs from contexts

[1] These are related to the forms of conjoint orientation to the country of origin as well as the more or less wide-reaching social cohesion of these groups (*Vergemeinschaftung*). On the idea of the Diaspora, cp. Cohen, 1999.

[2] On the difference between formal organisations and associations, self-organisation, etc. cp. Luhmann, 2000 and Stichweh, 2000.

where such goods are – or are supposed to be – provided by the state. In this case, migrants may substitute for the wanting state service in their country of origin. As will be shown below, this difference proves to be relevant for the different kinds of involvement among Egyptian, Afghan and Serbian migrants. By contrast, activities with a *political orientation* are those that are primarily concerned with producing political decisions, that are involved with these decisions or the structures in which they are made or that are able to be mobilised with a political dynamic in these countries.

Section 4 formulates the conclusions and some recommendations.

2. Description of the Diaspora Communities

2.1. The Egyptian Diaspora in Germany

2.1.1. Egyptian Student Migrants: The Rotary Clubs

The majority of immigrants from Egypt to Germany have traditionally been male students of the upper middle class (Schmidt-Fink, 2001). They have studied linguistics and cultural studies, natural sciences and engineering.[3] These students began coming in the 1950s, and this tradition of student migration has continued to today. In 2001, 58% of all Egyptian citizens who came to Germany did so for educational purposes. In 2003 and 2004, 76% of the Egyptian migrants were student migrants (Table 2). In total, just under 14,500 Egyptian citizens now live in Germany. Egyptian authorities give the much higher number of 24,000. The difference in the data derives from the different procedures for statistically measuring emigrants and immigrants in the countries of origin and the receiving countries. In receiving countries, often only first generation immigrants who possess a foreign passport are counted. The naturalised migrants and migrant children who have a right to citizenship in the receiving country often are not included in the immigration statistics.[4]

Table 1: Immigration Data of Egyptian Citizens to Germany

Year	Incoming	Outgoing
1988	2,400 (*)	
1995	1,600 (*)	
2000	1,742	1,327
2001	1,917	1,361
2002	1,870	1,348
2003	1,592	1,512
2004	1,446	1,458

Source: German Federal Statistical Office, VI B, Migration statistic
(*) Data from: (2001), International Migration Statistics in the Mediterranean Countries: Current Data Sources and Statistics Available from International Organisations, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities**:** 47.

In comparison to migrants from other Arab countries and Turkey, Egyptian student migrants have been able to establish themselves quite well in Germany. This immigrant group has high percentages of naturalisation (Table 3) and a high percentage of marriages with German partners (Gesemann, 1995). Beyond that, a relatively large share of Egyptian migrants are highly skilled (14.6%: Gesemann, 1995). The well-situated Egyptian student migrants have founded numerous associations and professional interest organisations. Furthermore, they are active in German politics. Beyond that, they have co-founded various Muslim and Coptic communities.[5] In this study, however, we have concentrated on the secu-

[3] In 1992, for example, 30.8% of the Egyptian students in Germany were studying engineering, 24.5%, communication and cultural sciences, as well as sports, and 23.6% were studying mathematics and the natural sciences (Gesemann, 1995).

[4] On the problems and particularities of comparing the immigration statistics from Med-MENA countries, cp. Fargues, 2005.

[5] The self-organisation of Egyptian migrants in line with religious criteria is, by the way, another differentiating characteristic in shaping migrant networks. In the 1950s, after the assault on Egyptian President Nasser, some representatives of the religious intelligencia fled to various states, including Germany. They became a part of the Islamic elite in Germany. They founded mosques and assumed leadership positions in the Islamic associations. One Islamic organisations in Germany, which was founded by Egyptian Muslim activists and is still dominated by them, is the Islamic Community In Germany [*Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland*] (IGD). The first Islamic centre of the community was founded in the 1960s in Munich under the direction of one of the most important activists of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the IGD president, the members of IGD now coordinate around 60 Islamic communities nationwide. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimates that

lar organisations and networks of the well-situated Egyptian migrants because the activities of the migrants in these groups are prominent in their country of origin.

Table 2: Egyptian students from Abroad and Those with Permanent Residence in Germany (absolute numbers)

Year	Egyptian Students from Abroad	Egyptian Students with Permanent Residence in Germany
2001	1,125	66
2002	1,222	56
2003	1,211	53
2004	1,124	68

Source: Wissenschaft-Weltoffen, 2005

Table 3: Egyptians Naturalised in Germany

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Numbers (absolute)	423	465	443	437	381

Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005

Already in the 1960s, there were regular meetings of Egyptian students in Germany. Such groups existed in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Munich, Dusseldorf, Hamburg and Heidelberg. Few of these were registered as associations with the German officials. The first groups were something like extended circles of friends. They were often initially based on friendships able to be traced back to family contacts and ties in Egypt. During their studies, many formed new acquaintances in Germany. Some of these student groups later were established as cultural clubs. Their active members now consist of professional, successful Egyptians. During the 1970s and 1980s, further Egyptian cultural clubs and professional unions were founded. In 1983, in order to strengthen the existing informal contacts among associations, 24 Egyptian associations and professional unions joined together to form the “Egyptian House”, an umbrella organisation of Egyptian organisations in Germany.[6]

The Egyptian professional elite in Germany is nationally connected in this way. The network is publicly represented through the respective cultural and professional clubs and the umbrella organisation. Viewed from outside, it is held together by a common ethnic origin. The associations define themselves as “Egyptian associations”. In the official association statutes, Egyptian heritage is usually the most important membership criterion. In reality, however, admission to this network is only open to people of a certain social status. Some associations select by means of higher membership fees; in other associations, different exclusory mechanisms are at work such as demeanour, relationships or family background.

there are around 1,300 active members of IGD (Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004, www.bmi.bund.de or www.verfassungsschutz.de). In the 1960s the first Copt immigrants from Egypt came to Germany. Egyptian Christians were primarily student migrants. Approximately 66% of them had a university degree (Ibrahim, 2000). Over half the Egyptian Copts in Germany married Germans. Over half of all Copts have been naturalised (Ibrahim, 2000). The official number of Copts in Germany today runs at around 5,000 (Ibrahim, 2005). At the beginning of the 1990s, Copts founded two monasteries with the support of Christian churches in Germany, which serve as culture and meeting centres. In all, there are now 12 active Copt communities in Germany.

[6] In Germany, there are also Egyptian associations that are not a part of the German Egyptian House. It would be interesting to find out how these associations are organised, what relationship they have to the Egyptian House and what tasks they assume. In this pilot study, however, it was not possible systematically to include these “independent“ associations.

Finally, the core members are people who are professionally successful in Germany or who come from important Egyptian families. Religious affiliation, by contrast, hardly plays a role. The form of self-organisation of the highly qualified Egyptians thus resembles that of Rotary Clubs in certain respects. Like Rotary Clubs, the Egyptian associations in Germany serve to reproduce, stabilise and strengthen their own elite networks.[7]

Table 4: Immigrants from Egypt in the Selected *Bundesländer*

	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**
Baden-Württemberg	1,507	1,507	1,466	1,176
Bavaria	1,460	1,528	1,551	1,230
Berlin	1,678	1,783	1,789	1,810
Hamburg	1,559	1,635	1,677	1,698
Hessen	1,628	1,571	1,556	1,262
North Rhine-Westphalia	2,257	2,298	2,271	1,920

Source: Compiled from the foreign statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden

2.1.2. Egyptian Marital Immigrants, Refugees and Irregular Immigrants: Weakly Organised Networks

A small group of legal immigrants from Egypt are individuals who enter the country for family reunification, usually as the result of a marriage with a German spouse. These are normally middle class men who move to be together with their German wives. Between 1984 and 1992, however, a certain number of asylum seekers also came to Germany. In particular, there was a sharp rise in the number of Egyptian applicants for asylum in 1991 and 1992, but this number once again rapidly fell after the "asylum compromise" in 1993. The reason most applicants appealed to was persecution because of religious affiliation. Many were Egyptian Christians, more precisely, Copts. Another group consisted of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was illegal in Egypt. The acceptance quota from both of these groups was no more than 1.2%. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that some applicants for asylum of Egyptian origin have permanently settled in Germany (Gesemann, 1995). In addition, since the beginning of the 1990s, irregular immigrants of Egyptian origin have continuously entered Germany. There is little information about their precise numbers and social background. All that is known is that, in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, there were organised smugglings of Egyptians across the border at a price of up to DM 10,000. We can thus presume that it was not the poorer who managed to come to the West, but those from middle class families (cp. Elwert, 2002).

In the 1980s and 1990s, it was therefore mainly Egyptian migrants from the middle class that entered Germany in the ways depicted. Little is known about the social situation of these migrants. It can be presumed that, like migrants with similar immigrant patterns, they have

[7] Not all Egyptian professionals are connected with this relatively closed network, which was formed from the 1960s to the 1980s. Some Egyptian intellectuals are not active in pure Egyptian assemblies, but in Arab ones (for examples, see Gesemann, 1995). Many have no interest in participating in these associations, although they are often in contact with association members. In particular, Egyptian students who have very recently come to Germany, and second generation Egyptians in Germany are hardly active in the Egyptian associations. The associations' members are getting older, and their activities are gradually winding down. The board of directors of the Egyptian House has recognised this problem and established the goal of opening the association to young members. The umbrella organisation wants to improve its Internet site since young people would prefer loose relationships over the Internet. Other strategies for supporting new members are also being pursued. One Egyptian cultural association intends to change its statutes to ease the access of younger association members to the board of directors. Besides that, it has taken on the job of supporting newly arriving Egyptian students at a local university.

more difficulties gaining access to the German educational and labour markets (cp. Bommes 1999). The legal status of their residence is unclear, at least for those who came in the first years. Moreover, their educational degrees are not recognised in Germany. The lack of sufficient knowledge of German is a further difficulty. Against this background, many of them experience a decline in social status relative to that of their families in their country of origin. These migrants presumably depend on personal networks, which primarily help them secure employment, income, housing and other forms of social support in the immigration context.

Within the framework of this pilot study, this group of Egyptian migrants and their support networks were not further investigated. The empirical study primarily focusses on self-organised groups of migrants. Here, however, we do not come across any organisations that include or represent these structurally weakly positioned Egyptian migrants. The Egyptians we interviewed presume that these migrants would tend to be found in Muslim organisations. In addition, the literature indicates the existence of organisations formally recognised as associations, but which factually function as small companies (mostly travel agencies). These are said to be operated by Egyptian immigrants with a relatively low social status (Gesemann, 1995).

2.2. The Afghan Diaspora in Germany

2.2.1. Structure, Distribution and Immigration Phases

According to the data of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, approximately 100,000 Afghan migrants have settled in Germany.[8] This rough estimation includes Afghan citizens and Germans of Afghan origin. Because the latter category is no longer registered with the Foreign Central Registry [*Ausländerzentralregister*] (AZR), the following demographic data only relates to those with Afghan citizenship.

Table 5: Afghan Population from 2001-2004 by Gender

Year	male	female	total
2001	39,766	31,896	71,662
2002	38,193	30,823	69,016
2003	36,179	29,651	65,830
2004	31,321	26,612	57,933

German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005

In December 2004, according to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, a total of 57,933 Afghan citizens lived in the German Federal Republic, of which 50,457 were born abroad and 7,476 were born in Germany. The number of men outweighs that of women by about 5,000, but the difference has decreased in the past few years (Table 5). While all age groups are represented, 60% of all Afghans living in Germany are under the age of 30 (Figure 1). Nearly two-thirds of the Afghan population in Germany live in Hamburg, Hessen and North Rhine-Westphalia, whereby Hamburg has the largest Afghan population in Germany (and Europe), with 14,469 registered inhabitants (Table 6).[9] Afghans have preferred to settle in urban centres. Their concentration in particular *Bündesländer* and cities is because ex-

[8] See http://www2.gtz.de/migration-and-development/konferenz-2/deutsch/afghanen.htm.
[9] For the differences in the social structure of the Afghan population in the mentioned *Bundesländer*, see, Horr et al, 1989.

tended family initially moved there, and there are better chances for acquiring work within the larger communities already settled there.

Table 6: Regional Distribution of the Afghan Population in Germany, Stand 31 Dec. 2004

	Male	female	total
Baden-Württemberg	1,674	1,286	2,960
Bavaria	4,634	3,351	7,985
Berlin	441	349	790
Brandenburg	329	196	525
Bremen	189	170	359
Hamburg	*7,655*	*6,814*	*14,469*
Hessen	7,370	6,551	13,921
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	70	21	91
Lower Saxony	1,902	1,678	3,580
North Rhine-Westphalia	4,881	4,533	9,414
Rhineland-Palatinate	758	638	1,396
Saarland	51	35	86
Saxony	861	512	1,373
Saxony-Anhalt	67	25	92
Schleswig-Holstein	706	548	1,254
Thuringia	42	15	57

Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005

Before 1979 fewer than 2,000 Afghans lived in Germany; these were primarily businessmen and students. In particular, Hamburg, as a port city, drew Afghan businessmen, among them many carpet dealers, who founded businesses there because of the warehousing. In the 1960s and 1970s, numerous (mostly male) students also came, including some of those we interviewed. They studied various disciplines, but primarily medicine and engineering. With the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, many refugees sought asylum in Germany.[10] In the course of the 1980s, and, in particular, the 1990s, the Afghan population increased sharply, and by 2000, 72,199 Afghan citizens were living in Germany (Figure 2). After that, the number of Afghan migrants in Germany fell: for one, this can be explained by the lower number of new asylum applicants after 2001 (Table 7); for another, by the number of those naturalised (Figure 4). There are three immigrant waves of Afghan refugees connected with different phases of war and the respective relationships of political power.[11] In the first phase, which followed the takeover of power by the communist DVPA in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979, refugees were primarily members of the western-oriented educated elite (e.g. university professors, teachers and students), high-ranking public officials or well-situated businessmen, who encountered, or feared, the repression of the communist regime. After the

[10] The violent conflict in Afghanistan since the end of the 1970s has produced a very large refugee Diaspora. While most Afghan refugees sought protection in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran – at the end of the 1980s, around 3 million Afghan refugees lived in both countries (cp. UNHCR Afghan Refugee Statistics, Sep. 2001). A minority, who had the necessary economic and social resources, managed to migrate to the West. In Europe, Germany was the most important country of destination for the Afghan refugees. Since the beginning of the 20th century, close institutional and economic relationships had developed between the two countries, which offered points of contact for an escape route to Germany (cp. Schetter, 2004).

[11] For more on the various refugee phases, see, for example, Centlivres-Demont, 2000 und Tietjens, 2002.

takeover of power by the mujahideen in 1992, people fled the country who had belonged to or worked for the communist regime or were associated with it.[12] The third phase began with the ascendancy of the Taliban, from their takeover of Kabul in 1996 to the deposition of the fundamentalist regime in 2001. As a result of the repressive politics of the Taliban – in particular, the repression of women – members of the urban middle class who had held out until then made attempts to immigrate to the West. Ethnic and religious minorities also increasingly left the country – for example, Shiite Hazaras, the Ismailis, Hindus, Sikhs – whose lives were threatened by the extremist Taliban.[13]

Figure 1: Afghan Citizens by Age Group, Stand 31 Dec. 2004



Source: *Ausländerzentralregister*

Figure 2: The Development of the Afghan Population in Germany from 1967-2004



Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005
Note: 1967 to 1990 – earlier federal territory; from 1991 – Germany; because of the revision of the Foreign Central Registry (AZR) in 2004, the data in the years previous to that are only comparable to a limited degree.

[12] Besides that, directly after the fall of the Berlin wall, numerous Afghan fellowship holders went to universities of the former East bloc states in the West (cp. Centlivres-Demont, 2000). For information on Afghan student migrants to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), see, for example, Hötzeldt et al. and Zamani, 2000.

[13] Not all left Afghanistan because of political persecution. People also fled because of the bombings and other dangers connected with the war conflicts. According to our interview partners, in the 1980s many people came to Germany from Herat and Kandahar because these cities were especially affected by the war. During the fighting between the rivalling muhjahideen at the beginning of the 1990s, Kabul, in particular, was under permanent siege; as a result, the main city population was forced to flee. Besides that, for many, economic reasons motivated the migration to Germany. They wanted to earn money here in order to be able to support their families in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

While the first refugees were nearly exclusively from among the elite, as time passed, Afghans who were not as well-off or as well-educated increasingly came to Germany (Tietjens, 2002). It was not uncommon for these refugees to have to sell their property and go in debt to pay for their emigration. Sometimes they were also supported by members of the Diaspora in Germany. Given the different motivations and different social makeup in the immigration waves from Afghanistan, the migrant population is very heterogeneous. Afghans in Germany differ considerably in regard to their religious and political orientation, their educational background and their social strata.

2.2.2. Residence Status, Educational Background and Vocational Qualifications

Afghan migrants in Germany possess differing forms of residence status. About 40% have German citizenship. Between 1981 and 2004, a total of 37,456 people were naturalised (Figure 4). In comparison to other migrants in Germany, the number of cases of naturalisation among the inhabitants of Afghan origin is relatively high.[14] Among the Afghans without a German passport, 80% possess a more or less stable residence status (Figure 3) and just under 17% have the German *Duldung* status (which is a statutory temporary suspension of deportation).[15] One's residence status has a large influence on the social opportunities available in Germany. As a rule, those with *Duldung* status, as well as those currently seeking asylum, are not allowed to study at university or to attend a vocational school; they are also subject to work restrictions. Moreover, they are not allowed to leave the region they are assigned to inhabit while in this status.

Table 7: Asylum Applicants with Afghan Citizenship from 1995-2004

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Asylum Applicants	**7.515**	**5.663**	**4.735**	**3.768**	**4.458**	**5.380**	**5.837**	**2.772**	**1.473**	**918**

Source: *Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF)*

The majority of Afghans who have moved to countries in the West are from the cities, and, on average, they have a higher educational level than those coming from Afghanistan's countryside (Centlivres-Demont, 2000). In a study of the AGEF (a working group on development and professionals in the area of migration and technical co-operation) from 2002 on the skilled-labour potential of Afghan migrants in Germany (it also included Germans of Afghan origin), 30.9% of those surveyed indicated that they possessed the matriculation standard for university, and 18.2% indicated that they had a college degree. According to the study, the best represented vocational groups among Afghans are teachers, architects, engineers, medical doctors and nurses. However, this positive assessment must be relativised, for in many cases the degrees, including doctorates, were acquired long ago, and only a

[14] In 2000 the naturalisation percentage among Afghans was 6.61%, and that of all foreigners was 2.56% (Tietjens, 2002).

[15] The different residence permits are connected with the time of the immigration and changes in the German asylum and immigration policy. Until 1980 Afghan citizens could enter Germany without a visa and remain in the country for three months. Against the background of the cold war, at the beginning of the 1980s, Afghans were accepted as "victims of communist aggression", and they were generally very quickly granted a right to asylum. This changed in the further course of the 1980s, and in 1988 74% of the applications for asylum were rejected (Horr et al., 1989) In the 1990s nearly all of their applications for asylum were rejected because, in the wake of the civil war, no state institutions any longer existed in Afghanistan, and thus state persecution could no longer be demonstrated (Hötzeldt et al). Refugees, who often entered irregularly or with false papers, had hardly any chance of getting recognition on the basis of the asylum law or the Geneva 1951 Refugee Convention. Their stay was merely tolerated on humanitarian grounds or because of a general deportation stop to Afghanistan (Arendt-Rojan et al., 2005; Gehrig, 2004).

small percentage of those surveyed have had the opportunity to acquire vocational experience in their learned professions in Germany. This has been a consequence of the work limitations associated with immigration and asylum law.[16] They have thus often had to accept jobs that they were overqualified for, and they have received no further training in their learned professions. Those we interviewed presume, by contrast, that second generation immigrants, who are still receiving their education or who have recently received their degrees, will have better chances. The Afghan migrants who have experienced social decline in the receiving country place particular value on the education of their children in the hope that a long-term investment in education will help them manage the risks of exile (Centlivres-Demont, 2000 and Zulfacar, 1998).

Figure 3: Afghan Citizens by Residence Status, Stand 31 Dec. 2004



Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005
(The figure does not include the small number of people with EU residence permits – temporary: 42 people; and permanent: 12)

Figure 4: Afghan Citizens Who were Naturalised



Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005
Note: Until 1990, earlier federal territories; from 199,1 Germany; 1997-1999 without Hamburg

[16] 78.4% of those questioned indicated having no or less than one year of experience in their learned trade.

2.2.3. Social Interaction and Forms of Organisation

Loyalties and friendships that originated in Afghanistan, as well as relationships with immediate family and further relatives, are of great importance. In addition, social networks within the Afghan Diaspora obviously play a major role. On the basis of the information and materials available to us, a detailed view of their inner structure and of the ways they work cannot be offered. In what follows, we will address comprehensive perspectives emphasised in the social interactions among the Afghan migrants active in associations.

The Afghans in Germany have differing ethnic backgrounds, regional origins and mother tounges. The Tajiks and Pashtuns form the largest groups; beyond that, in particular, there are Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuristanis, groups from the Pashai speaking regions, as well as Hindus and Sikhs (AGEF, 2002). According to those we interviewed, some associations only have members of a particular ethnic group, for example, Pashtuns, even if such exclusivity is not written into the association statutes. Migrants of the same regional or local origin foster intensive contact with one another, and in one case this regional identity was the obvious basis for founding an association, which aimed to support the reconstruction of the infrastructure in the members' home region. In addition, ethnic affiliation and/or a shared regional origin are usually coupled with a common mother tongue, as the basis for mutual understanding. However, the significance of ethnicity in the process of setting social boundaries is to be viewed with caution; according to Nassery (2003), social status is much more important for the internal structure of the Diaspora.

A further significant criterion is religious affiliation. The large majority of Afghans are either Sunni or Shiite Muslims. According to Tietjens (2002), the percentage of Shiite Muslims in Germany is relatively high in comparison to the population in Afghanistan because many members of the persecuted Shiite minority fled through Iran to Europe. Among the Afghans in Germany, the Afghan Hindus and Sikhs are a self-contained group, with a strong inward orientation (Daume, 2004). They have founded associations in a series of German cities, joined under a Hindu and Sikh umbrella organisation that champions their members' interests in Germany.

The political background of the Afghan migrants is an important basis for group formation and internal boundaries. In the 1960s and 1970s, students from Afghanistan joined associations, mostly leftest in orientation and influenced by the political movements of the 1960s.[17] Today these are no longer active, but some of these former students have established aid organisations that are active in developmental work in Afghanistan. In addition, second generation Afghans have again founded numerous Afghan student and youth associations with the aim of networking within Germany and supporting student and youth exchanges in Afghanistan. In the 1980s Afghan migrants founded political associations that were supportive of the respective different opposition parties that were involved in conflict in Afghanistan. Among these are various Islamisist resistance groups (mujahideen), royalists, Maoists or small liberal parties. Later, members of or adherents to the deposed communist government founded their own associations; most of these had come as refugees at the beginning of the 1990s. In this way, the organisation structure mirrors the political camps in Afghanistan's conflicts and reproduces a constellation of its conflicts in Germany.

[17] In 1968, the General Union of Afghan Foreign Students [*Generalunion afghanischer Studenten im Ausland*] (GUAFS) was founded.

Afghan women in Germany have joined forces in diverse associations with the aim of improving the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan.[18] They work to establish networks, initiate and and supervise educational and vocational projects for women and girls and carry out political public relations work to throw light on the situation of women in Afghanistan. The members of these groups that we questioned are scattered throughout Germany, span various generations and have differing social backgrounds.

In addition to matters related to the common cultural background, numerous associations simultaneously offer an organisational basis for Afghans working in the same professions. In particular, Afghan medical doctors and other medical professionals are organised in Germany.[19] In 2002 eight associations joined together in the Governing Body of Medical Professionals and their Colleagues in German speaking Nations [*Dachverband des medizinischen Fachpersonals und deren Kollegen im deutschsprachigen Raum*] (DAMF e.V.) (Medicana Afghanica, 2003). Its objective is to improve healthcare in Afghanistan. Beyond that, one association is committed to matters of interest to Afghan medical doctors in Germany. For example, it deals with matters related to the recognition of degrees or to limitations to practicing of one's profession due to provisions of the law concerning immigrants. In addition, Afghan engineers and technicians have founded two associations: the Association of Engineers and Technicians in Germany [*Verein afghanischer Ingenieure und Techniker in Deutschland*] (VAIT e.V.) and the Society for Agricultural and Technical Development [*Gesellschaft für landwirtschaftliche und technische Entwicklun*g] (GltEA).[20] They manage projects aimed at improving the infrastructure in Afghanistan, particularly in the energy sector. Furthermore, Afghan teachers[21] are active in parental associations, and organise native language courses in Hamburg.

It has been pointed out that the main perspectives described so far, which underlie the confraternities, networks and associations of the migrants, are not mutually exclusive, but are able to be combined with one another; so, for example, political orientations are related to religious orientations and ethnic groupings, and are especially to be found among a certain social strata.[22] Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the majority of the Afghan associations in Germany are primarily concerned with structuring life in the receiving country. For example, they facilitate the practice of religion by constructing sacred sites, or they reproduce cultural traditions by organising joint celebrations. These must be differentiated from organisations that have been founded primarily with the aim of offering services in Afghanistan or assisting Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The professional associations or women's associations are cases in point. Besides these, there are numerous other NGOs in Germany without

[18] This union was able to occur on the basis of a joint political orientation (e.g. at the DVPA - RAWA, an international network underground organisation of Afghan women), but it also transcended political associations, i.e. some women's organisations were able to overcome political differences (e.g. *Afghanisch-Deutsches-Frauenforum e.V.* in Bonn).

[19] According the AGEF study already mentioned, 7.8% of those questioned indicated that they were medical doctors; a further 7.6% indicated that they were nurses or other medical specialists.

[20] 10.3% of the immigrants are architects, engineers and those in related professions. They thus constitute one of the largest occupational groups of Afghan migrants in Germany (AGEF, 2002).

[21] Teachers constitute the largest professional group of the Afghan Diaspora in Germany, 11.1%.

[22] For example, in the communist associations, there is a subdivision in line with the two wings of the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), the Khalq and Parcham, whereby adherents of the Parcham wing tend to come from the upper echelons of society. Members of the engineers association come from the educated middle class, and the majority are graduates of the Amani High School in Kabul (here, accordingly, the professional group one belongs to and one's social background are related). Furthermore, the Afghan Social Democratic Party is only to recruit Pashtuns (i.e. political orientation is connected with ethnicity).

a clearly defined membership, which are active in providing humanitarian aid and in co-operative development work.[23]

2.3. The Serbian Diaspora in Germany

2.3.1. The Guest Workers: Serbian Clubs

The massive recruitment of Yugoslavian guest workers to Germany began in 1961 and lasted until the general order to stop recruitment in 1973. In this time period, about 535,000 Yugoslavian labourers came to Germany (Table 8). Over one-third of them were from Serbia; most of the others came from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Haberl, 1978). Initially, largely unskilled workers were recruited; as time progressed, however, better qualified, skilled labourers were recruited (Table 9). After the recruitment stop, and as a result of the return policy, about one-fourth of the Yugoslavian labourers returned to their country of origin (Malac'ic', 1996). Less qualified migrants, with poor prospects of finding further employment, were among those who returned. This meant an increase in the average qualification level of the Yugoslavians who remained in Germany (Haberl, 1978). The recruitment stop, however, did not just result in the exodus of less qualified labourers, but also in the immigration of the families of those immigrants who remained in Germany. Thus, the number of Yugoslavian citizens in Germany during the 1980s remained at roughly the same level, despite a considerable exodus (Malac'ic', 1996). With the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, the number of immigrants from the disintegrating Yugoslavia once again rose considerably. Between 1991 and 1997, approximately 300,000 people left the country; and just under half of them went to Germany and Austria (Simeunovic, 1997).[24] The last immigrant wave finally came with the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s.[25]

Today, about 500,000 immigrants with Serbian citizenship live in Germany. The present immigration balance of Serbians in Germany is negative (Table 11). In other words, more Serbians are leaving the country than entering it. The politically forced return of refugees after the Kosovo conflict probably lies behind this sinking trend in the migration numbers. Together with the naturalised migrants, it is estimated that about 700,000 migrants of Serbian origin live in Germany. Their social situation varies in accord with their residence status and the length of their stay. However, most of them came within the framework of the labour migration of the 1960s and 1970s and as part of the familial reunification moves in the wake of that. Their social situation is relatively secure. In 2004, 60% of them had a secure residence status (Table 10). The Yugoslavian labourers, like all of the earlier “guest workers”, were successively politically integrated via the labour unions and the alien resident representatives that were established in the municipal governments in the 1970s and 1980s. Given that many of these immigrants held permanent employment contracts for a number of years and were integrated into the German social state apparatus, they increasingly accumulated political and social rights and became what Hammar (1989) and others refer to as denizens. Over time the social status of Yugoslavian guest workers increasingly came to resemble that

[23] One woman we interviewed estimates that there are approximately 70 relief organisations in Germany related to Afghanistan. Members, including founding members, are both Afghans and Germans. This study focusses on the empirical investigation of associations that were initiated by Afghans and in which the majority of members are Afghans.

[24] According to extrapolations by Torsten Jäger and Reso Jasna (1999), only 5% of the civil war refugees in Germany from Bosnia are of Serbian descent.

[25] However, here, too, the number of refugees of Serbian descent may be very low. In this phase of the conflict, Germany accepted Kosovo Albanians as well as Sinti and Roma from Kosovo. Serbians from Kosovo, by contrast, were among the domestically displaced, i.e. they mostly fled from Kosovo to Serbia (and not to other parts of Europe) (cp., for example, www2.amnesty.de/internet/deall.nsf/0/e233f4a8e296414dc1256aa00045d2d4?OpenDocument).

of German workers. Social advancement beyond that, however, has escaped the majority of them, in particular the Serbians. The educational situation of second generation migrants of Serbian origin demonstrates this. Although, the Serbians (including the Montenegrins) are among the largest of the migrant groups in Germany, a relatively low number of them study at German universities. They constitute only 3.5% of all the second generation immigrants educated in Germany, while such percentage levels are significantly higher for the other groups (Table 12). The second generation Serbians in Germany thus have tended to inherit the social status of their parents.

Table 8: The Total Number of Yugoslavian Emigrants by Select Receiving Countries, 1961-1973

Jahr	Benelux	*Germany*	France	Austria	Sweden	Switzerland	Europe Total
1961		*17,500*	200		1,900		30,000
1962	6,700	*36,400*	500	1,000	2,400	1,100	50,000
1963	9,800	*42,900*	2,000	2,700	2,600	2,000	90,000
1964	12,000	*48,800*	3,900	5,500	3,700	5,500	115,000
1965	12,000	*68,700*	6,600	13,200	7,600	8,500	140,000
1966	11,000	*90,500*	10,000	25,700	13,100	10,000	210,000
1967	10,000	*84,800*	32,800	37,500	14,000	11,000	220,000
1968	9,000	*148,400*	40,800	35,600	14,800	12,500	300,000
1969	14,500	*297,000*	52,100	40,100	17,700	21,000	420,000
1970		*415,500*	62,700	56,100	22,600		550,000
1971		*434,900*	69,900	128,800	22,900	34,000	660,000
1972	15,000	*465,600*	77,200	166,200	24,000	40,000	760,000
1973		*535,000*	86,200	195,500	25,800	32,000	860,000

Source: Haberl, O, N, (1978) – Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien, Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und Rückführung, Munich, R, Oldenbourg Verlag Munich, p. 276.

The Yugoslavian labour migrants were primarily supported by the efforts of the Yugoslavian state to maintain the immigrants' loyalty to their country of origin. This occasioned the formation of their own associations. In the 1970s the Yugoslavian consulates initiated the establishment of "Yugoslavian clubs" in Germany. It was mainly welfare organisations such as the German AWO and the municipalities that contributed to the financial support of these clubs. In 1975 there were already 130 Yugoslavian clubs, each with approximately 150 members (Haberl, 1978); and in 1980 there were 400 clubs (Brieden, 1996). With the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, most of these clubs were disbanded; for the collapse of Yugoslavia was closely linked with the (re-)mobilisation of various forms of "nationalism", which also affected the labour migrants. In particular, Serbians and Croatians rediscovered their national identities; and in a certain sense, a segment of the Serbian and Croatian populations living abroad became outposts for the national movements in their country of origin (Conversi, 2000 und Frykman, 2002). Correspondingly the earlier Yugoslavian clubs reformed themselves on a national or ethnic basis, and the 1990s witnessed a boom in Serbian clubs, which, like other national or ethnic groups from Yugoslavia, celebrated their newly discovered national pride and national identities. The Yugoslavian consulates supported this new "Diaspora nationalism". By contrast, German organisations were reluctant to support Serbian associations. However, with the break in the diplomatic ties between Yugoslavia and

Germany in connection with the NATO intervention, the close relationships between the Serbian clubs and the consulates were also broken off. These relationships were not reanimated after the renewal of diplomatic ties.[26]

Table 9: Qualification Structure of the Yugoslavian Labour Force Recruited to the Federal Republic, 1969–1973

Year		**Total**	**Lacking qualifications**	**With qualifications**
1969	absolute	67,745	55,526	12,226
	%	*100.0%*	*82.0%*	*18.0%*
1970	absolute	106,495	77,203	29,292
	%	*100.0%*	*72.5%*	*27.5%*
1971	absolute	73,492	51,389	22,103
	%	*100.0%*	*69.9%*	*30.1%*
1972	absolute	47,815	30,613	17,202
	%	*100.0%*	*64.0%*	*36.0%*
1973	absolute	67,111	42,663	24,448
	%	*100.0%*	*63.6%*	*36.4%*

Source: Haberl, O, N, (1978) - Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien, Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und Rückführung, Munich, R, Oldenbourg Verlag Munich, p. 284

Table 10: Residence Status of the Serbian Population, Stand 31 Dec. 2004

Citizenship	**Total**	**Residence Status of these:**					
		Stable Residence Status		**Residence Authorisation** *(Aufenthaltsberechtigung)*	**Residence Allowance** *(Aufenthaltsbewilligung)*	**Residence Approval** *(Aufenthaltsbefugnis)*	**Statutory Temporary Suspension of Deportation** *(Duldung)*
		Temp.	**Perm.**				
Yugoslavia	381,563	77,406	117,449	65,753	2,704	32,656	50,103
Serbia and Montenegro	125,765	30,510	31,594	15,827	791	13,475	23,285

Source: *Ausländerzentralregister*, Compiled by the *BAMF*

In summary, the Yugoslavian guest workers were initially well-organised with the help of their country of origin. In the 1990s the network of Yugoslavian clubs was replaced with Serbian associations. However, these have lost complete support from their country of origin since the end of the 1990s. As a result of this, many clubs have been disbanded. What is left are a range of sport, folklore and culture associations, whose continued existence is also threatened today. At present there is thus a quite low degree of organisation among the Serbian workers in Germany.

[26] The political causes for this were certainly that the new government discontinued all the measures of the “Diaspora policy” after the deposition of Milosevic. In addition, the new political elite of Serbia, which saw itself as the democratic opposition, supposed that the Serbian clubs consisted of the conservative rural, who tended to be lacking in resources and to support the Milosevic regime.

2.3.2. Serbian Intellectuals and Student Immigrants: The Political Mobilisation of the Elite

In the 1950s intellectuals from Serbia had already migrated to Germany. Many of them were supporters of the monarchy and critics of the communist regime. Later, Serbians continued to come to Germany to study, but in smaller numbers; and they have remained largely unseen. At present just under 1,000 Serbians register at German universities as foreign students each year (Table 13). However, the percentage of immigrants from Serbia and Montenegro who are entering Germany for educational purposes is gradually increasing. In 2001 it was 4%; in 2004, a solid 5%. It is to be expected that the importance of student migration from Serbia will increase because student migration from the border states of the EU is being supported within the framework of the European educational policy, while the other forms of migration (familial related and political) are tapering off.

Table 11: Immigration Data of Citizens of Serbia and Montenegro to Germany, 2000-2004

Year	Incoming	Outgoing
2000	33,015	89,269
2001	28,349	35,989
2002	25,501	36,303
2003	21,442	27,958
2004	20,366	25,679

Source: German Federal Statistical Office, VI-B, *Wanderungsstatistik*

Table 12: Students of Serbian Origin with Permanent Residence in Germany in Comparison

Country of Origin	Absolute Number of Migrants (1)	Percentage of all Students with Foreign Origin, but Permanent Residence Status (2)
Turkey	1,764,318	29%
Italy	548,194	5%
Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro	*507,328*	*3.5%*
Greece	315,989	6%
Poland	292,109	4%
Croatia	229,172	6%

Source: (1) *BAMF*, 2004; (2) German Federal Statistical Office, 2004

Table 13: Serbian and Montenegrin Students from Abroad and Those with Permanent Residence Status

Year	From Abroad	With permanent residence status
2001	1,116	2,454
2002	1,108	2,345
2003	1,104	2,206
2004	1,097	2,155

Source*: wissenschaft-weltoffen*, 2005

Some of the highly qualified Serbians who have lived in Germany for a long time have managed to become well-established. According to the Serbians we interviewed, many of them are medical doctors, teachers and engineers in Germany. Within the framework of the study, we were also able to establish contact with Serbian journalists, university employees and interpreters. In addition, a number of middle-sized entrepreneurs are among these highly qualified migrants.

In connection with the Serbian-Croatian conflict at the beginning of the 1990s, in Germany highly qualified Serbians were also involved in activities related to national issues. Like the Serbian guest workers, they organised Serbian cultural clubs, but in contrast to the Serbian guest workers, these operated largely autonomously. They primarily concentrated on the political and social development in Yugoslavia, although some of these associations had strong contacts to the Serbian orthodox church in Germany and contributed to establishing new church communities in Germany.[27] After the introduction of party pluralism, unofficial party offices of nearly all the newly established political parties from the remnants of Yugoslavia were established in Germany. Most of these were called into existence by highly qualified Serbians and students. With the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s, the political mobilisation of the highly qualified Serbians reached its highpoint. Their organisations actively protested the NATO deployment in Serbia, organised public appearances against what they perceived to be a skewed media presentation of the situation in Yugoslavia, campaigned for aid initiatives for Serbia and came forward for or against Milosevic. With the end of the war and the calming of the domestic political situation, the activities of the associations also lost their mobilising élan.

While the number of highly qualified immigrants and student immigrants from Serbia is low, they can be strongly mobilised. However, their activities were exclusively directed towards the conflict-laden political situation of their country of origin, and with the normalisation of relations in Serbia, they lost power and intensity.

[27] Far more than 250,000 believing Serbians now live in Germany, organised in diverse communities. The Serbian Orthodox Church in Germany is subject to Episcopal Orthodox theology and Orthodox Church law. It forms a diocese with a bishop at the head and has 29 large communities and 36 sanctuaries for church services in Germany. At present 16 churches belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church. These are in various cities, including Düsseldorf, Osnabrück, Munich, Hanover, Berlin, Dortmund, Stuttgart, Ulm (www.kokid.de/bistuemer/sok.htm).

3. Diaspora Activities and Their Significance for Developmental Policy

3.1. Economic Activities of the Diaspora

3.1.1. Remittances

Over the past few years, attention has increasingly been paid to immigrants' remittances to their countries of origin, because in many countries they constitute a considerable share of the gross domestic product (GDP); they contribute to the balance of payments; and in many cases they surpass the amount of official inflows in these countries (see *The World Bank*, 2005; Straubhaar and Vadean, 2006). But a more detailed look is needed, since there is a gap in the empirical knowledge of remittances, the conditions under which they are made and their respective utilisation.

a) Missing data

There are numerous reasons for the incomplete data on the remittance flows from Germany to Afghanistan, Egypt and Serbia. In Afghanistan and Serbia the statistical collections are very meagre. In Egypt the methods of data collection employed differ significantly from those employed in Germany.

For Afghanistan neither national offices nor international finance organisations record remittance inflows. According to the unpublished statistics of the German Federal Bank, €22 million in workers' remittances were made from Germany to Afghanistan in 2004. However, these statistics only record official cash transfers of unnaturalised (i.e. foreign-national) Afghans in Germany.

The remittance flows back to Serbia are not recorded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Serbian Central Bank only documents running public and private transfers in aggregate, without distinguishing these according to the source country.[28] According to unpublished statistics of the German Federal Bank, €240 million were transferred from Germany to Serbia in 2004. Here, too, however, only official cash transfers of unnaturalised (i.e. foreign-national) Serbians living in Germany are recorded.

The statistical databases for Egypt are much better, but the information of the Egyptian Central Bank differs from that of the German Federal Bank. According to the Egyptian Central Bank, the inflow of workers' remittances from Germany in 2004 amounted to US$90 million (cp. Fargues, 2005). According to unpublished statistics of the German Federal Bank, however, workers' remittances amounted only to €4 million. This considerable difference in the statistical data results from the different methods for estimating the remittance flow. The Egyptian Central Bank very broadly interprets all transfers from private individuals abroad received by private individuals in Egypt as workers' remittances, although such transfers may also be from foreigners. By contrast, the German Federal Bank only views cash transfers as remittances, and it aligns this data by means of extrapolation on the basis of statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency [*Bundesagentur für Arbeit*] on the employment and

[28] The largest share of the remittances are included in the balance of payment statistics under the category "Workers' Remittances" (under Current Transfers). According to the specifications of the IMF, further categories in which remittances are booked are "Compensation of Employees" (under Income) and "Migrants' Transfers" (under Capital Transfers) (for more on remittances in the balance of payment statistics, see Straubhaar and Vadean, 2006).

unemployment of foreigners. This, however, results in a strong underestimation, because neither foreigners who have entered into employment without the full social insurance benefits nor those members of the Diaspora who were naturalised in Germany are included in the statistics.[29]

A further explanation for this great discrepancy in the numbers is that the Egyptian Central Bank probably includes "Compensations of Employees" and "Migrants' Transfers" in their estimation of the remittance flows. Furthermore, it is possible that certain transfers are booked by the central banks under different categories. Such private transfers may be booked, for example, as remittances by the Egyptian Central Bank and as direct investments by the German Federal Bank.

b) The importance of the length of residence

One hypothesis about the way the households behave in regard to remittances presumes that, in the process of assimilation in the receiving country, the intensity of the relationship to the region of origin in general, and to the relatives who remain there in particular, decreases, and that the remittances to the country of origin decrease accordingly (Lucas; Stark, 1985 and Glytsos, 1997). However, among those we questioned, the financial support for family members remained relatively constant over a long time span. Remittances to purchase property or as productive investments also appear to be typical for migrants with long-term and stable residence status in Germany. These migrants were able to save more money over time, and they thus had a stronger investment potential. The hypothesis that an increase in assimilation results in a decrease in remittances to the country of origin therefore could not be confirmed for the three Diaspora communities we studied.

c) The importance of the official finance system

The economic theory presumes that the weaker the official case studies system is or the more threatened the country of origin is by political, institutional or macro-economic instability (e.g. war, bank bankruptcies, inflation), the greater the use of informal transfer channels. Our case studies confirm this. On the basis of the poor infrastructure of the finance sector, most of the transfers flow to Afghanistan through the informal *Hawala* system, according to the information of the IMF, 80%-90% of them. Serbia has a well-developed banking system, yet the Serbian population in Germany does not trust this system because the Serbian government nationalised their currency accounts in the 1990s in order to finance the war. Furthermore, the fraudulent pyramid systems[30] as well as hyperinflation have resulted in further uncertainty. Even though the Serbian finance market is now more stable, there are stronger guarantees and attractive interest rates (e.g. 4%-6% for fixed deposits in euro), and many West European banks have opened branch offices, it is estimated that approximately one-third of the remittances flow through informal channels (Jelasic, 2004). By contrast, Egypt registers the highest share of remittance inflows through official channels, an estimated 50%-

[29] In the German statistics, as in those of other countries of Continental Europe, differentiations are made according to country of citizenship. In Anglo-Saxon countries one differentiates according to country of birth.

[30] A *pyramid system* (also known as a *snowball system*) is, in a broader sense, a social process, in which those who participate early on reap the advantages and those who participate late reap the disadvantages. In the case of monetary investments, participants are enticed by the high interest rates. The high interest rates are financed by the investments of later investors. The system collapses if too few new participants join, and as a consequence, the investments, including interest, can no longer be paid at the end of the respective terms. The later the participants join in this type of system, the sooner they loose their invested money.

70%.[31] This is due to the relatively well-developed banking system and the relative macro-economic and political stability in recent decades (the latter which can hardly be considered certain in the future).

d) The cost of transfers

Transfer costs also play an important role in the choice of the remittance channels. The informal *Hawala* is used by most Afghans because the transfer is considered safe, and it only costs 1%-2% of the transferred amount. A formal *Hawala* is presently being established in Germany. With fees of 3%-5% of the transferred amount, it is more expensive than the informal *Hawala*, but it is competitive with the transfer services offered by banks and cheaper than Western Union. Furthermore, it offers better service, transferring the money directly to the receiver's address. Among Egyptians, non-cash transfers appear to be common. The costs of the bank remittances are comparatively low, at 3%-4%. Nevertheless, according to those we interviewed, in order to save the transfer costs, there are many cash transports.

By contrast, among Serbians it is much more common to transfer money through bus and travel companies. At 8%-10%, the costs are much higher than bank remittances (3%-4%) or remittances with Western Union (7%). Yet, the mistrust of financial institutes, which resulted from the experiences in the 1990s, appears to have remained, and to be decisive for the choice of the mode of monetary transfers.

e) The amount of the remittances and their uses

The use of the remitted funds depends on the economic situation of the migrants, those who receive the money, as well as the political and macro-economic situation in the country of origin. For example, the majority of the population in Afghanistan lives under the poverty line (53%) (CIA, 2005), and many families, in particular among the rural population, are dependent on remittances (*The World Bank*, 2004). Afghans in Germany do not possess great financial potential. As a consequence, according to the information of our interview partners, Afghan migrants regularly transfer smaller amounts (approximately €200 per month), which largely serve as a means of subsistence for the recipients.

On the basis of the size of the Serbian Diaspora in Germany, it possesses greater financial potential than the Afghan Diaspora. Because Serbia, with a per capita GDP of US$2,700, is among the world's middle income countries (CIA, 2005), we presume that the means of subsistence of those living there does not depend as much on the transferred funds as in Afghanistan. As a consequence, the use of the transferred funds in Serbia differs from that in Afghanistan. According to our interview partners, Serbians transfer on average about €5,000 per year, the majority of which goes into the construction or renovation of houses or purchase of real estate. They view investments in real estate as lucrative, and both less complicated and safer than business investments.

Egypt is also among the group of countries in the middle income bracket (per capita GDP, US$4,400). In comparison to Serbia, however, in recent decades it has enjoyed relative political and macro-economic stability. In addition, many members of the Egyptian Diaspora in Germany are from Egypt's affluent elite. It is thus not surprising that the majority of their remittances to Egypt is invested, among other things, in real estate, industries, service

[31] The estimated share differs in the various studies (cp. Carling, 2005 and ECORYS, 2005).

branches, education (for more on this, see Section 3.1.2). Many Egyptian immigrants also individually support Islamic organisations through voluntary contributions known as *Zaqqat* and *Sadaqqa*;[32] most of this is for the construction or maintenance of schools and mosques in their hometowns (ECORYS, 2005).

To conclude, remittances seem to play an important role in alleviating poverty in poor countries. In middle income countries, through an increased demand for real estate, they contribute to the development of the construction sector. If the Diaspora possesses the adequate financial potential and confidence in the macro-economic framework, then remittances to the country of origin increasingly flow into investments and the development of the infrastructure.

f) Macro-economic importance

From a macro-economic perspective, remittances have played a positive and important role in the countries of origin included in our study. They have contributed to covering a considerable portion of the trade deficit. In Egypt they have even resulted in a surplus in the balance of payments. In general it is estimated that the substantial inflow of remittances has contributed to the stability of the exchange rates in all three countries.

3.1.2. Direct Investments

a) Different types of involvement

The Serbian, Afghan and Egyptian migrants we investigated play an important role in the economic structural development of their countries of origin in various ways. This is underlined, for example, by the data of the *Afghanistan Investment Support Agency* (AISA),[33] which claims that 28% of the investment in Afghanistan is from the Afghan Diaspora. However, three forms of migrant engagement in direct investment processes are to be differentiated.

Well-educated migrants with less capital contribute to the economic structural development of their countries of origin by using their involvement there as a chance for career advancement within the framework of companies' transnationalisation processes. These types of migrants, for example, might have years of work experience with a German company, and within the framework of this work, convince the company management that it would be profitable to carry out business operations in their country of origin. They clarify the conditions for suitable investment possibilities, play an active role in bringing about these investments and take on management positions in the newly founded daughter companies after the investments have been made. We primarily found cases of this sort among the Afghans and Serbians.

Other migrants play an important role in the implementation of direct investments in their countries of origin by exploiting their good contacts to their home country governments, and playing a mediating role. So, for example, one Serbian who earlier worked as an economic

[32] According to the Koran, 2%-5% of one's income should be donated to the poor or an Islamic charity. This contribution is to be paid annually as a *Zaggat*. *Sadaqqa* is money that is voluntarily donated for such purposes.

[33] The *Afghanistan Investment Support Agency* (AISA) was established in 2003 by the Afghan government – and the GTZ served as a consultant – in order to offer information about investment possibilities in Afghanistan and to offer various services for investors, e.g. consulting for local bank and credit systems and possible relief programs, as well as support in establishing enterprises and help in acquiring licenses (www.aisa.org.af).

attaché in the Serbian consulate was employed by a German consulting firm. Using his good contacts to the Serbian government, he was able to serve as a consultant for German companies with direct investment plans in Serbia. Another example is an Afghan who played a role in the development of a mineral water plant in Kabul. Through an acquaintance who was employed by the Afghan government, he was brought into contact with an Afghan investment group for which he took on the responsibility of organising the purchase of machines in Germany, having them transported to Afghanistan and having them installed and implemented there. He also arranged the servicing of the machines and functioned as a business and technical consultant for the newly established company.

By contrast, migrants with sufficient financial resources act as investors on their own right. As expected, this was found most frequently among the Egyptians. So, for example, a German businessman of Egyptian origin employed approximately 1,000 Egyptians in an auto accessories plant. In addition, he owns a hydraulic plant, which trains its employees in Germany. Another Egyptian businessman with residence in Germany made profits with shares in a paper factory in Egypt. In addition, he founded a trade company, which primarily was involved in distributing machines, as well as special stones for high temperature ovens and steel for German companies. Finally, he invested in the tourist branch. An Egyptian doctor who completed his specialist training in medicine in Germany and had a parallel practice in Germany also opened an orthopaedic practice in Cairo in which patients are examined by German medical doctors via telemedicine. Two further examples of successful investments are taken from the Egyptian education system. One highly qualified Egyptian who was educated in Germany opened a private German school in Cairo. Another, who had completed the post-doctoral habilitation in Germany, founded a private German university in Cairo.

b) Comparative advantages of the migrants

The entrepreneurs we questioned, in particular those from Egypt, view themselves as having an advantage over both Egyptian entrepreneurs without migration experience and middle-sized foreign investors. Through their studies in Germany and multiple years of work at German universities or with companies, they have acquired professional expertise and contacts that their competitors there lack. In addition, some of them have political contacts at various levels in Germany, and they are able to mobilise these contacts to promote particular investment projects (the case of the German University in Cairo is one example).

Central resources of the entrepreneurial migrants that result from their migration are their relative affluence and strong inner-ethnic networking and organisation. The contacts that they have made and fostered are not limited to Germany. Starting with the acquaintances in their Diaspora, important contacts have been expanded to and developed in their respective countries of origin. In the case of Egypt, two conditions were especially responsible for this: The economic and political culture there is characterised by clientelism, and, correspondingly, the right connections often set the tone for entrepreneurial success. A number of the highly qualified Egyptians are from families connected in important clientelist political and economic networks.

Correspondingly, family loyalty is of great importance. Among nearly all entrepreneurial Egyptians that we interviewed, members of the extended family were active in founding or directing the company. In some cases, they made financial capital available; in others, they took on managerial tasks on site or saw to the business development.

c) Obstacles

The described advantages of entrepreneurs who do in fact become involved in ventures in their country of origin also indicate the context that prevents many migrants from becoming involved in enterprises there. Many of them decide not to get involved in business in their country of origin, although they have all the prerequisites, because numerous obstacles also stand in their way.

Many of them view the strong divergence between their professional socialisation in Germany and the business culture in their countries of origin as an obstacle. Migrants from all three case studies who regularly visit relatives in their countries of origin or take holidays there complained about corruption and the lack of reliability of the business people there. For many migrants rooted in Germany, this is a decisive reason not to invest there. For potential investors among the migrants, the business culture, which has become foreign to them, is also a barrier if they view their cultural background as a comparative advantage per se and thus overestimate it.

The fact that affluent migrants, on the whole, rarely make economic investments in their country of origin is also to be explained by the fact that direct-investment success requires special effort. Among other things, it calls for making the country of origin a long-term or even permanent focal point in one's life. Given family ties and already existing business or professional responsibilities in the immigration country, this is not always possible.

In addition, direct investments require a lot of capital – among other things, the capacity to accept losses and financially bridge them for a certain amount of time if necessary. According to our interview partners, the still insecure political and legal frameworks (in Afghanistan, Serbia), along with the poorly functioning litigation (in Afghanistan, Egypt and Serbia), are considerable obstacles, as there is the difficulty of successfully collecting outstanding debt from unpaid bills. In a country such as Afghanistan, further material obstacles are the lack of an infrastructure (in particular, electricity) and the difficultly of gaining access to land, properly skilled labour and financial services (*The World Bank*, 2005).

3.1.3. Foreign Trade

a) Personal business contacts

In all of our case studies, migrants contributed to the maintenance and development of trade relationships with their countries of origin. Here, individuals from the three migrant groups assumed mediating roles. Individual business relationships and personal contacts in the country of origin are among the most important factors for reducing transaction costs. This confirms the theory that the network connections of small ethnic groups (as among Afghans, Egyptians and Serbians in Germany) incur lower transaction costs.[34]

[34] Larger ethnic communities (relative to the population of the receiving country) that have many transnational connections tend to make information about the markets available, whereby, Diaspora members serve as intermediaries (Rauch and Trindade, 2002). In this case, transaction costs only sink if the migrant groups are from a country whose social and political institutions vary sharply from those of the receiving country (cp. Münz, 2006).

Thus, the settlement of carpet traders in Hamburg, which stored their goods in the free-harbour and founded branch offices, was one of the most important reasons that Afghans later also chose to immigrate there. The strong presence of Afghans in Hamburg then resulted in the further development and expansion of the carpet trade with Afghanistan (and in general with countries of the Near East). The harbour became one of the most important entrepot sites for carpets worldwide. Half (of approximately 300) of the carpet trade companies in Hamburg are owned by businessmen of Afghan origin, at least according to the subjective assessment of one interview partner.

In the case of the Serbian Diaspora, for example, one member of the Serbian association served as a consultant for synthetic material producers on the German labour market. In addition, he mediated contacts between Serbian forest enterprises and German wood processing companies. Another member of the Serbian Diaspora, who works for Audi, prompted the production of a catalogue of Serbian car products. There is a solid demand for the catalogue from the automobile industry as well as individual car dealerships in Germany.

b) Challenges

In particular in the cases of Egypt and Serbia, those interviewed pointed out that the problem of observing quality specifications (such as, for example, packing requirements) and the lack of production standards were severe obstacles to expanding exports to Germany and the European Union.[35]

In Egypt many companies lack clear production standards, and quality control procedures are deficient. Precisely this made it possible for one of our interview partners to establish an intermediary company for cumin oil. Because the quality of the oil is not possible to be reliably checked in Egypt, few importers from Europe risked importing the goods directly from Egypt. The Egyptian businessman therefore imported the raw materials to Germany and had them processed into oil there. Given the lacking standards in Egypt, he could not rely upon the oil producers there, since the quality varies greatly with production. The establishment of independent monitoring sites or laboratories in Egypt is key to providing Egyptian employees with discipline and forcing them to provide consistent quality. However, given the lack of information and experience, it is very difficult for producers to provide such quality; so there is a danger that they will loose access to the European market. The Serbians are familiar with similar problems, and the objective of one project carried out by the GTZ to promote the Serbian export industry was to inform Serbian producers of EU-compatible product standards and advise them of ways to achieve these standards.

However, increasing the quality and production standards is not merely a problem concerning exports. If the domestic production does not achieve the demanded (and elsewhere supplied) quality, remittances increasingly flow into imports. Then the demand, which has increased due to remittances to the country of origin, no longer contributes to the development of domestic production capacities; correspondingly, the developmental chances potentially connected to this are lost.

[35] This problem has probably not yet arisen in Afghanistan, because the domestic production cannot even satisfy the domestic demand. With the development of production capacities, it will also become important.

3.2. Activities Related to Infrastructure Development

The previous section dealt with the activities of migrants related to their countries of origin, mainly from an economic perspective. There we focussed on money flows, monetary applications and the uses of business or professional competencies, and we inquired into their effects on trade balances, the structure of demand and investment, the development of industry and trade and the establishment of product standards. However, migrants are not primarily engaged in their countries of origin through economic activities, even if these activities have considerable economic consequences. For example, first of all, monetary transfers serve the reproduction of the family; and this spending, for its part, can have economic effects. Through individual actions or organisational activities, migrants also contribute to (re-)developing or maintaining the social infrastructure, related to issues of education, healthcare, science or other public goods provision. In each case, this is a matter of creating or maintaining the structural conditions in the mentioned areas, which undoubtedly initially require investment, and whose failure to function considerably limits the functionality of markets. In what follows, we look into the contributions of Afghans, Egyptians and Serbians to the development of the infrastructures in their respective countries. Within this framework, we investigate whether individual or collective activities are at issue. Here, we also attend to the scope of the activity, its duration and the respective motivation for it.

3.2.1. Egypt

It is mostly highly qualified migrants who contribute to the development of the infrastructure in Egypt. Nearly all the projects that we are familiar with were the responsibility of individual migrants. Few were collective projects – projects of migrant organisations or other migrant affiliations. Here we will list some examples of the individual and collective infrastructure projects of the highly qualified Egyptian migrants.

a) Individual infrastructure projects

Healthcare sector: The activities of one doctor are exemplary here. He studied medicine in Egypt and went to Germany in the 1980s to complete a specialist training. After some years of working in a hospital, he founded his own medical practice, which thrived. In the 1990s he began to work on the idea of founding a practice in Egypt, and after some years, it was opened. Since then he has commuted back and forth between the German and the Egyptian practices in bi-weekly rhythms.

Education: While the German University in Cairo is considered one of the successful projects of the Egyptian Diaspora in their homeland, there is in fact no collective actor behind the project, but a single individual. The university founder completed his doctoral education and wrote his post-doctoral habilitation in Germany, but returned to Egypt upon completion. There he followed up the idea of doing independent academic work. First, he inquired into the possibility of founding an institute, which, however, was not able to be established in its originally envisaged form. So he decided to use his existing contacts to Germany, and he intensified his contacts to his former host university and to political bodies in Germany. The German host university offered to serve as the official sponsoring university for the German University in Cairo. The political contacts of the university founder were even strong enough that, together with a delegation and members of Egyptian associations, the German Chancellor at the time, Gerhard Schröder, participated in the opening of the university. After this successful symbolic prelude, the German University in Cairo was able to gain the support of

six further German organisations. The university is a private facility. Some of our interview partners reported that the university founder invested his entire family assets in the university. It is a for-profit institution, aimed especially at the Egyptian upper middle class. Less affluent Egyptian families thus have no access to this university.

A less known, but similar, project is the German School in Egypt. The founder of this school was active in business in Egypt for a number of years. He is co-owner of a processing plant in Egypt and a German-Egyptian trade company. He also has holdings in other smaller investment projects. On the basis of his steady business success, he began long-term investments in education. He opened a private German school in Cairo. The school is bilingual, and structured in accord with the predominant didactic teaching principles in Germany. It aspires to co-operative work with a secondary school in Germany. The school competes with two other established German schools in Cairo and attempts to allure middle class Egyptian families with low prices.

Besides the establishment of such for-profit educational and scientific facilities, Egyptian migrants are also involved in more idealistic efforts that aim to mediate the exchange of science and scientists as well as professional know-how.

Scientific exchange and knowledge procurement: Some Egyptian migrants who have had long-term employment in German higher education have made efforts to facilitate the exchange of students and knowledge between Egypt and Germany. In particular, professors of Egyptian origin in Germany have made short stays and/or further academic qualification possible for Egyptian students at German universities. Academic experts in history and the cultural sciences have invited Egyptian colleagues to give lectures or other presentations of their work. According to our interview partners, some university lecturers of Egyptian origin also offer gratis seminars and presentations in Egypt. The efforts to facilitate the exchange of knowledge do not only take place at universities; they can also be found among other Egyptian professionals. For example, one Egyptian doctor practicing in Germany organised a medical congress in Egypt. Another specialist has carried out seminars on specific therapeutic methods not yet known in the area where the seminars were offered. One person involved in the German-Egyptian cultural exchange worked in support of the newly built library in Alexandria. Two engineers who did their doctoral studies in Germany founded an institute for the study of solar energy in Egypt. They aspire to work in collaboration with German scientists.

Welfare: An Egyptian political scientist who serves as the director of a social information centre at a German welfare organisation founded an association that organises various forms of support for members form the Copt underclass in Egypt. Apart from its founder, the association consists mostly of Germans. It carries out a few smaller projects for Copt garbage men in Cairo and is dedicated to further projects for women and girls. Besides that, it supports a Coptic school in Egypt and carries out educational and work projects in a region strongly affected by migration. As the founder of the association and its main activist, the Egyptian social worker was decisive for the association's focus on Egypt and especially on the Copt minority. However, he had difficulties finding an association partner from the Diaspora. Solely the Coptic church in Germany symbolically supports him; but it does not count this initiative among its own projects, and it provides neither personnel nor financial assistance to the association. However, the local priest of the Coptic church is a formal member, and he provides personal support, for example, accompanying the association during student trips through Egypt.

b) Collective infrastructure projects

According to our information, the number of infrastructure projects of organisations of Egyptian migrants in Germany appears to be rather small. The Egyptian Businessmen's Assembly [*Verband der ägyptischen Unternehmer*], together with the Egyptian House (the two most important organisations representing Egyptian professionals in Germany), supports the development of a children's cancer clinic in Egypt. In total, €20,000 was collected for the clinic, and expertise was provided for planning and carrying out the project. The objective of a further project was to construct a kindergarten in an Egyptian city. This project was carried out by the oldest Egyptian association in Germany, which is also a member of the German Egyptian House. The association managed to gain the support of other Egyptian organisations in Germany for the project, and thereby to acquire money from them.

3.2.2. Afghanistan

The empirical data indicates the existence of numerous infrastructure projects from migrant organisations. These projects and the commitment to the infrastructure that sustains them are to be viewed against the background of the political circumstances in Afghanistan. The (still) weak Afghan state is not in a position to provide advance legal and political concessions that the aid organisations can rely upon; as a result, these organisations must assume a great deal of risk, and they are confronted with problems such as corruption. Through over two decades of war, the infrastructure in all areas has been largely destroyed, and the Diaspora organisations fulfil tasks originally carried out by the government. They consequently are substituting for the state by assisting in creating the infrastructure.

To carry out infrastructure projects, Afghan migrants in Germany have consolidated (e.g. in professional clubs, women's and students' associations, diverse aid organisations, foundations). The first organisations were established at the end of the 1970s, when the Soviet invasion resulted in a flood of refugees from Afghanistan. At the beginning of the 1990s, programs of German developmental co-operation supported the establishment of further NGOs of Afghan migrants in Germany. For example, the GTZ implemented a skilled-labour program with the goal of helping integrate Afghan migrants in Germany into the reconstruction and developmental efforts in their country of origin after the end of the communist regime. However, because of deteriorating political conditions in Afghanistan after 1992 (the outbreak of the civil war), the project's objective – the integration of Afghan skilled labourers – was called into question. The skilled-labourers program was transformed into an immediate action and emergency assistance program for returning refugees from Pakistan and Iran: Here Afghan migrants took on advisory functions or assumed developmental tasks on their own initiative. In the framework of the skilled-labourer program, further-education seminars were conducted and various specialist groups were established (in agriculture, healthcare, construction, residential planning, energy and industry, vocational education, elementary education and women's advancement). On the basis of the specialist group work, some independent structures developed, leading to the establishment of associations.[36] After the political changes in Afghanistan in 2001, numerous further NGOs were established (not only Afghan migrant organisations), which are active in diverse infrastructure projects in the country.

[36] For example, the Association of Engineers and Technicians in Germany [*Verein afghanischer Ingenieure und Techniker in Deutschland*] (VAIT e.V.), the Association for the Agricultural and Technical Development of Afghanistan [*Gesellschaft für landwirtschaftliche und technische Entwicklung Afghanistans*] (GltEA), the Afghan Women's Association [*Afghanische Frauenverein*] (AFV e.V.), the Afghan Aid and Development Service [*Afghanische Hilfs- und Entwicklungsdienst*] (AHED) (cp. GTZ Schlussbericht, 1995: *Fachkräfteprogramm Afghanistan*).

Afghan migrants are active in serving the public good in Afghanistan both as association members and as individuals. Here, however, these two forms of action have not been analysed separately because the majority of projects are carried out collectively. Their strong interest in the reconstruction of the country results from the fact that they were affected by the social catastrophe either directly or indirectly, through relationships with their families. According to our empirical data, most individual activity consists in the donation of materials, for example, school materials. An exceptional number of projects of Afghan Diaspora organisations are concerned with providing for the *healthcare* and education infrastructure. In addition, the data identifies projects that serve the development of social welfare, the emancipation of girls and women and the provision of energy.

Healthcare: Because of the lack of qualified medical personnel, the level of healthcare in Afghanistan is very low. The work of the organisations we questioned thus serves to provide the necessary infrastructure. They may provide the materials to build or renovate clinics, for example, to equip them with operating rooms and air conditioners, guarantee the supply of water or to set up (mobile) outpatient clinics. One example is an association of medical doctors, which has supported a gynaecological and paediatric clinic in Jalalabad since 1999; here, free gynaecological and paediatric examinations are carried out. The association covers the salaries of the personnel and the costs of renting the building. Furthermore, with the help of donations, a dentistry clinic that a Diaspora Afghan earlier ran was able to be redeveloped. In collaboration with an Italian NGO, DAMF e.V. built a healthcare centre for refugees in Chewa. DAMF e.V. is also planning to establish a university hospital in Mazar-e Sharif.

An attempt is being made to redress the lack of medical equipment, medicine and nursing resources (beds, wheelchairs) in Afghanistan by transporting these items from Germany (these are donated, for example, by hospitals, doctors and pharmaceutical companies) (cp. Medicina Afghanica, 9/2003). Acting as “capacity builders”, individual members of doctors’ associations – in particular under the co-ordination of DAMF e.V. – are active. They provide the personnel infrastructure needed to educate and train colleagues in Afghanistan. By doing so, they promote various specialisations in the Diaspora medical training in diverse areas (e.g. in the diverse areas of dentistry, pediatric medicine or cardiology). Besides providing training courses in Afghanistan, DAMF e.V. offers individual fellowships for doctors from Afghanistan. They are able to audit courses in particular departments of German clinics, depending on their specialisation. Afghan doctors living in Germany use their contacts to hospitals or other medical facilities to procure placement.

Education: As in the area of healthcare, it is also necessary to create the infrastructure preconditions necessary for education.[37] Since 2001 numerous school buildings have been newly constructed, and many young boys and girls have been provided with schooling.[38] However, the lack of a qualified teaching personnel is also a major problem. Activities of the Diaspora organisations include the new building and rebuilding of schools, redevelopment, the construction of toilets and deep wells, the supplying of school furniture. For example, in Kunduz the the Afghan Women’s Association [*Afghanische Frauenverein*] (AFVe.V.) built a school building in which girls can be given lessons in the morning and boys, in the afternoon. In the province of

[37] The illiteracy rates in Afghanistan are among the highest in the world. Under the communist regime, there were at least educational offers in the cities. With the outbreak of the civil war in the 1990s, the educational system increasingly collapsed, and under the Taliban in particular it was not possible for girls to attend school.

[38] The number of new people being schooled is estimated at about 3 million (National Human Development Report, 2004).

Wardak, the Association for the Agricultural and Technical Development of Afghanistan [*Gesellschaft für landwirtschaftliche und technische Entwicklung Afghanistans*] *(*GltEA) built a school that had been destroyed in the war. In the secondary school, students can be taught from grades one to twelve; there they can be prepared for university. With the financial assistance of other organisations, the Afghan Communication and Cultural Centre [afghanischen Kommunikations- und Kulturzentrum] in Berlin and the Association Scheherazad [Verein Scheherazade e.V.] established a school in the province of Nimroz. Because of the liberal province government, coeducational lessons can be offered at this elementary school.

Beyond providing the constructional infrastructure, some organisations guarantee the ongoing operation of schools, for example, by hiring teachers and other personnel and paying their salaries. In addition, they provide teaching materials, as well as uniforms for the students. Besides the ongoing support for schools, there are special donations, for example, for children's school books and pencils, in which the products are bought on site or in Pakistan. A further objective of the organisation is to qualify the teaching personnel.[39]

Social welfare: The projects aiming at social welfare serve to substitute for the families destroyed in the war. The Afghan migrant organisations especially focus on assisting orphans, widows and children injured in the war. For example, one association has built a house for widows and orphans in Kabul in which widows live with their own children and one or more orphans in respectively self-contained housing units. In the "peace houses" of another NGO, young boys and girls with war injuries are looked after. Besides these concrete projects, interview partners also talked about project ideas, for example, a facility for the handicapped or a house for divorced women.

The emancipation of girls and women: Given the poor – or intermittent virtual lack of – existing possibilities for girls' education, some organisations focus on compensating for this long-term discrimination by building and supervising special girls schools, since coeducational schools will not be tolerated in large parts of Afghanistan. For adult women, for example, the *AFV e.V.* pays for educational centres in which women can learn the tailoring or knitting profession and simultaneously take part in courses on reading and writing, and on hygiene and nutrition. The training, along with the receipt of a sewing machine, ought to open the possibility for gainful employment. Our interview partners viewed the improvements of women's education and further-education possibilities for them as the most effective way to ameliorate their position in society.

Energy sector: Members of VAIT e.V. in Germany are involved with the development of the energy sector in their homeland; in this, they focus primarily on regenerative energy. One member of VAIT e.V. developed a solar lamp, which is meant to replace the health-damaging oil lamps. Attempts are especially being made to support development in rural areas because the international aid thus far has almost exclusively been concentrated in Kabul. One association has built a model village in the province of Wardak on the basis of regenerative energy. Simple equipment generated with solar energy alleviates the work of women when they are washing, baking or beating milk in butter production. To obtain energy, the village has built stations consisting of a combination of solar modules and windmills.

[39] According to one woman we interviewed, various NGOs that are active in the educational sector in Afghanistan have formed a working group to consult on the possibilities for providing Afghan teachers with qualifications. The new curriculum drawn up by the Ministry of Education requires that they be trained. Numerous associations in Germany are involved in the area of education; these often have Afghan members, but more German ones. Many of them meet annually at a conference in Iserlohn.

3.2.3. Serbia

The commitment among Serbian migrants to developing the infrastructure is now on the verge of disappearing. Beyond the efforts of isolated individuals to promote the exchange of science and knowledge between Germany and Serbia, there are neither individual nor collective infrastructure projects. On the whole, today the Serbians appear to be more concerned with the possibilities for generating the public and political representation of their interests in Germany. For example, the creation of a Serbian umbrella organisation is planned, which is primarily aimed at representing the interests of Serbians in Germany. Many Serbian associations lack resources. They are thus concerned with securing their own survival. Relationships of various Serbian organisations to their country of origin have tended to develop in the political arena. However, these have usually ended up leading to symbolic political acts (i.e. the reciprocal recognition of the Diaspora and the Serbian state), but not to concrete common projects or state concessions to the Diaspora (for more on this, see Section 3.3.2). In the past, Serbian migrants have admittedly been involved in both collective and individual activities to develop the infrastructure in Serbia. These reached their highpoint during and immediately following the NATO deployment in Serbia at the end of the 1990s. With the normalisation of the political situation in Serbia, however, the number of infrastructure projects drastically fell. In the following, we will look into the period of political crisis in Yugoslavia, in which migrants were mobilised to develop the infrastructure, and into the period after 2002, when activities declined.

a) Individual activities

Above all, individual migrants from Serbia supported their regions of origin during the war. For example, one professional employee of a German corporation organised a machine to control water quality after the bombing of chemical factories gave rise to the danger of contaminated water. Other individual initiatives included the transport – at the organisers' own costs – of clothing and medicine to Serbia. Most people, however, made smaller donations to relief projects of Serbian clubs in Germany, to the relief funds set up for Serbians in Germany, or they remitted money to the donation accounts of German relief organisations.

b) Collective activities

During the Kosovo war, the migrants were especially mobilised to donate. Among other things, the clubs utilised these financial resources to make humanitarian support available to the Serbian population. The humanitarian support primarily consisted in the transport of relief articles. Some clubs delivered the relief articles (medicine, clothing, blankets and other donations in kind) to central collection sites; others sought out addresses of Serbians in need (e.g. hospitals, children's homes, refugee camps) and delivered the goods directly to those places. With the end of the conflict, there was initially no decline in the mobilisation of the migrants and the wave of relief from the Serbian clubs in Germany. A period of political euphoria followed, reflected in high expectations for the Serbian state among migrant organisations and individual Serbian activists abroad. Activities focussed on the reconstruction of the infrastructure. For example, an association of highly qualified Serbians established a faculty for dentistry in a Serbian city. In addition, highly committed and well-situated migrants of Serbian origin in Germany, Switzerland and Austria (a few came from the USA and other countries in Europe) joined forces and founded the "Council of the Diaspora" immediately following the end of the Kosovo conflict. In the framework of this body, funds were established, and within

a very short time, DM 13 million were donated. The money generated from the funds was used to build bridges that had been bombed in Serbia, as well as two children's hospitals. In some German cities, Serbian cultural clubs joined forces to carry out aid projects in Serbia. During the Kosovo war, for example, a co-ordinating group of the Serbian associations was established in Munich, which worked together with German relief organisations. Within the framework of two projects, this co-ordination group collected money intended for establishing a school and purchasing medical equipment for a children's clinic in Belgrade. The Serbian orthodox church in Germany also supported various initiatives, primarily aimed at procuring godparents for orphans.

c) The decline in activities after the end of the conflict

With the relative normalisation of the political situation in Serbia, there was also a decline in the Serbian migrants' involvement in developing the infrastructure. For one, this was because Serbian clubs and migrant alliances were no longer able to collect large donations. With the end of the conflict, the willingness of the Serbians living in Germany to donate decreased rapidly. For another, the highly qualified Serbians who were especially active did not manage to achieve their political aspirations for Serbia, and as a result they lost interest in participating in the public sector. For example, when Prime Minister Zizic assumed office, the Council of Diaspora mentioned above lost political influence because the new government thought many of the Serbian activists abroad were supporters of the Milosevic regime. Beyond that, in wake of the privatisation of the Serbian national affiliation, the relief funds account – together with the money invested – was lost. The Council discontinued all infrastructure projects in Serbia. Its activists are now involved in trying to locate the lost money of the fund.

Many democratically oriented, politically committed Serbians from abroad who saw themselves as part of the Milosevic opposition felt "betrayed" by the new Serbian government; for they neither acquired political influence nor the chance for real political participation. Some Serbian clubs that had organised relief projects for Serbia during the crisis period now say that they are hardly active because the Serbian government has shown no interest. This may also be due to the fact that governmental agencies have not approached them, and they thus cannot judge where and in which form aid is needed. In addition, today they are dependent on the financial support of institutional investors because it is very difficult to mobilise Serbian migrants in Germany "in peaceful times".

3.2.4. Case Comparison

In the case of Egypt, individual projects to develop the infrastructure are predominant. These have mainly aimed at education, science and healthcare. Egyptian migrants are very involved in infrastructure development. This involvement ranges from sporadic individual mediation activity, aimed at the exchange of scientists and knowledge, to long-term investments in educational, scientific and healthcare facilities. Those involved from Egypt are mostly migrants from the upper-middle class who came to Germany as student migrants and have pursued relatively successful careers in Germany. As a consequence, the migrants taking part in infrastructure development are educated and well-integrated. These professionals from privileged Egyptian families are primarily motivated by the desire to make a profit and to receive recognition for the social status that they have achieved in the course of their migration. In a certain sense, their involvement in Egypt allows them to duplicate and

strengthen their economic and social success by acquiring standing and influence among the professional, political and business elite in Egypt.

Among Egyptians, collective projects play a much smaller role. In particular, a comparison to to the Afghans' projects can highlight this. While the social status and the professional qualifications of the Afghan migrants are structurally similar, they are involved in much more diverse infrastructure projects, and their involvement is largely collective in character. By contrast, the Egyptian migrants hardly act collectively to contribute the solution of infrastructural problems in Egypt. The reciprocal relationships that arose in the migration process primarily serve informally to back individual initiatives (in particular, the further mediation of important contacts in Egypt, financial partnerships in promising projects, the promotion of projects in Germany and, in rare cases, the collection of donations).

In contrast to the situation in Egypt, in Afghanistan very diverse clubs and associations are involved in the development of the infrastructure. This involvement is very comprehensive and intense. On the balance, projects are collective. Most projects are not profit oriented, but aim at the public good, as that term is commonly understood. By supplying the systematic infrastructure for healthcare, education, childcare and other functions, the migrants' projects in Afghanistan aim to compensate for the severe inefficiency problems of the state. Here, similarly to in Egypt, the well-situated Afghans in the Diaspora are among the main activists. However, Afghan activists with a lower social status in Germany also take part in infrastructure projects. The successful mobilisation of the Afghans living abroad for the developmental needs of their country of origin is one of the most important conditions for the scope and intensity of the migrants' involvement. The interest of the world community, of different international organisations and, for example, of developmental aid organisations has especially risen since the 11th of September and the resulting NATO deployment in Afghanistan; at the same time, so has the interest of migrant organisations in the economic, political and social situation in their homeland. It is not just the traditional Afghan clubs in Germany that have turned their attention to Afghanistan. Many migrant organisations were established only after Afghanistan became increasingly important in international politics. The national consciousness of the Afghans, along with their feeling of belonging and of being responsible for Afghanistan, also increased. This can be seen, in particular, among second generation Afghans in Germany. In a political context in which German foreign policy and developmental policy, as well as international policy, focus a great deal of attention on Afghanistan, Afghan organisations – with their focus on their country of origin – enjoy great legitimacy and are thus able to fall back on various resources (money from different donators such as the developmental aid organisations, international organisations and governments, donations from migrants, the individual commitments of Afghan professionals or Germans). The degree to which the various activities in their country of origin will also continue after the political normalisation in Afghanistan remains to be seen.

The involvement of Serbian migrants in infrastructural development was induced by the Serbian political conflict. Here, the main motivation was the reawakening of Serbian nationalism in the 1990s. The involvement was thus aimed at easing the crisis situation in Serbia. The involved migration organisations and individual migrants hoped to be able to play a political role in the newly founded nation-state. However, this hope was disappointed. When Serbia in fact became politically independent, Serbian activists abroad lost political influence, and the potential for mobilising the broad migrant population sank. Financial and political resources were withdrawn from the Serbian clubs and individual activists, which led to a ces-

sation of their activities in Serbia. Many clubs are now on the verge of closing. While hardly any activities currently take place in the clubs, the club activists continue their contact with one another at a grass-roots level (they know and meet with each other). In the opinion of our interview partners, these connections could once again be mobilised for projects in Serbia. The clubs expect impulses for mobilisation (such as financial support for particular projects, but also suggestions of important infrastructural sectors in which support is necessary), either from the Serbian state or from other institutional donors (such as developmental co-operation organisations). Our interview partners view activities reliant upon money from their own ranks as having little chance of success.

A comparison of the cases clearly shows that activities of migrants that are aimed at infrastructure development are strongly dependent on the political situation in the respective country of origin. Political instability in the countries of origin, including military conflicts, appears to offer a reason for mobilising the Diaspora to address the infrastructure problems there. This could be observed among the Afghan and Serbian migrants. By contrast, migrants from politically stable states are involved in relatively few projects aimed at developing the infrastructure. In politically stable states such as Egypt, it is primarily wealthy migrants who are involved in infrastructure projects. In the course of the migration, they have experienced social advancement. Infrastructure programs in their country of origin offer them the possibility to gain symbolic recognition for their privileged status there as well. Here it is significant whether goods such as education and training, science, *healthcare*, transportation routes and energy and water supply are primarily provided through the state or also through the market. If such goods are primarily provided by the state, then the involvement of migrants in infrastructure development is contextualised by national and international politics in the way described, and it occurs in more or less close association with the politics/government of the country of origin (Serbians, Afghans). It aims at infrastructure sectors that are underdeveloped because of various types of state failure. By contrast, if the goods mentioned are also provided through the market, then possibilities are opened for migrants to invest in the infrastructure of their country of origin and, by so doing, to make profits.

The table below provides an overview of two factors influencing orientations of migrants' activities in our case studies: the mode of infrastructure provision and the political situation in the country of origin.

In accord with this typology, in the studies presented here, we have been able to identify three forms of migrant involvement. For one, Egypt provides an example of migrant involvement oriented on self-interest, as well as the desire to gain honour and self-esteem. Afghanistan and Serbia can primarily be classified as reflecting involvement for patriotic reasons. In the following, we will lay out a more detailed interpretation of two dominant types of infrastructure development activity among the Egyptian, Afghan and Serbian migrants. The third type, "involvement for reasons of power and identity, morality, honour and social esteem", which could be seen to motivate activities of some Egyptian migrants, is not studied here, because it lies on the fringes of our study, However, it would be desirable for a further study, building on the typology proposed here, to systematically compare these three types of activities.

Mode of infrastructure provision	Political situation in the country of origin	
	Political conflicts/instability	**Political stability**
Market		***Self-interested involvement***: Economic investments in the infrastructure by individual affluent migrants (Egyptians).
State	***Involvement for patriotic reasons***: a) Temporary compensation where there is a partial lapse of state provision. Here, infrastructure goods such as water, transportation routes, education, healthcare and relief are provided (Serbia); b) Long-term compensation for the complete lapse of state provision. Provision of education, further education, healthcare, science, energy and water supply and humanitarian aid (Afghanistan).	***Involvement for reasons of power, identity, morality, honour and social esteem***: Projects, where required, in infrastructure sectors with insufficient facilities (healthcare, social welfare) or in prestigious sectors (education, culture, science) (Egyptians, but in small numbers).

a) Self-interested Involvement:

The involvement of migrants from Egypt is paradigmatic for involvement in a politically stable state possessing a market mechanism for infrastructural provision. Given that involvement is mostly from individuals, Egyptian migrants in Germany are relatively weakly mobilised. The possibility of offering the facilities for healthcare, education and science on the market attracts migrants with solid financial resources and professional expertise. In developing infrastructural facilities (universities, schools, clinics, research facilities), they primarily aim at profit. For investments in these areas, highly qualified migrants have a considerable advantage over domestic professionals who lack the inter-cultural experience and contacts and over (other) foreign investors.

The German University in Cairo, which was sponsored by a German university and six further German institutes for the advancement of the sciences, is one example of an institution whose founding was facilitated by the successful use of political and professional contacts in Germany. Some of our experts and interview partners who are familiar with the history of this institution were of the view that this success is only to be explained in reference to the founder's successful use of these contacts and "skilled PR strategy". The contact with German institutions is not the only advantage that highly qualified investors from the Diaspora have over those who have remained in the country of origin. The contacts within the Diaspora are a further resource. In Germany, Egyptian clubs function, as described, like the Rotary Clubs and serve the reproduction of the professional Egyptian elite. The contacts formed and cultivated in the associations are not only spread throughout Germany. They also allow important relationships to be established in Egypt.

Through their investments in the infrastructure, highly qualified Egyptian migrants do not just have an advantage over domestic professionals. Infrastructure provision is also a niche that is less interesting for foreign investors, since such a niche requires long-term ties and is thus risky. In addition, it requires a lot of local knowledge and social contacts. Many of those

we interviewed have therefore participated in the development and management of the company activities. This has required their long-term presence in Egypt. In fact, the founding of an undertaking in these areas usually involves some form of a return to the country. While this often is a disincentive for foreign investors, for many Egyptian migrants, it is an attractive reason for doing business there.

In summary, politically stable contexts in which the infrastructure sector is open to market investments appear to make this type of involvement attractive to affluent migrants. Their involvement is typically through individual, long-term, profit-oriented investments. Investments in the infrastructure sector are also probable because highly qualified migrants have considerable comparative advantages in that sector.

b) Involvement for patriotic reasons:

In contrast to self-interested involvement, such as was registered (albeit not as the exclusive form) among Egyptians, the Afghans and Serbians tend to be involved for patriotic reasons. This similarity among the Afghans and the Serbians is due to the fact that the migrant activities in both countries that aimed at developing the infrastructure were induced by the political conflicts in their countries of origin and the loss of the state-supplied infrastructure. This was temporary and partial in the case of Serbia, and complete in the case of Afghanistan. In each case, these conflicts and their consequences resulted in a wave of mobilisation among the expatriates in receiving countries. In both cases, new migrant alliances arose, both with a focus on developing the lacking infrastructure and on easing the negative social consequences of the political conflicts in the countries of origin. Even those migrant organisations that were otherwise mostly concerned with representing the migrants' interests in the receiving country, or that supported the religious and cultural development of the migrants, became involved in the development of infrastructure projects in the respective countries of origin. These types of projects gained a great deal of recognition among the migrants living in Germany, and the migrants were able to be successfully mobilised for them, in particular, to financially back them. However, the involvement of the Serbian migrants once again decreased soon after the end of the military conflict in Kosovo. By contrast, the involvement of the Afghan migrants, which has experienced various conjunctures since the end of the 1970s, has not abated; and in the context of the political renewal in Afghanistan since the deposal of the Taliban, it has even increased.

The question arises as to why the involvement of the Serbian migrants was so short-lived, while the comparatively high level of involvement of the Afghans living in Germany in their country of origin continues.

One of the reasons for the diminishment in the involvement of the Serbian migrants lay in the Serbian activists' disappointment in the new Serbian state. The migrants were quite involved in various areas, especially during the breaking up of Yugoslavia, the war and while the Serbian state was being newly formed. In certain respects, it stepped in to compensate for the state, which was caught up in the war. However, in the wake of the demise of Milosevic and the change in the relationships of power, they ran up against political mistrust or ignorance. The hope, in particular among the intellectuals of the Diaspora, of being able to exert political influence and to participate in politics was largely disappointed, and their involvement, as well as the mobilisation of the migrants through the Serbian clubs, diminished considerably. The ability to mobilise migrants in Germany for Serbia was subject to two con-

siderable restrictions from the outset: For one, the financial resources of the worker migrants and their families were quite limited at any rate. For another, the Serbians in Germany were largely left in international isolation. They had to defend their involvement against public opinion, which viewed the Serbians as the cause of the Balkan conflict. Correspondingly, they found neither political nor financial support. Thus, because of inner-Serbian developments, such as the isolation of the Diaspora, after the end of the Kosovo war, the potential of national rhetoric – oriented on ethnic identity, national pride and solidarity with the Serbian folk – to mobilise sustained involvement was relatively quickly exhausted.

In Afghanistan no similar depletion of energies has (yet) occurred. Many of our interview partners are indeed dissatisfied with political developments there; but their involvement with the infrastructure is not oriented towards political participation as much as the Serbians' was. Rather, it is based on a more professional orientation (among medical doctors, engineers, teachers, scientists) which aims to redevelop functional and performance standards in the infrastructure in which they are themselves professionally involved. While their involvement is also motivated by their national identity, it is primarily guided by professional ethical norms and professional commitments. It is therefore less susceptible to being disappointed by politics in the newly formed state of Afghanistan. In addition, Afghan migrants in Germany have a long-term interest in developing and extending infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. Beyond that, Afghanistan and the involvement of its migrants are still held in high regard in international politics; consequently migrant organisations that are engaged in the infrastructural development in Afghanistan can continue to fall back on the support of various institutional donors (governments, international organisations, developmental aid organisations, etc.). But in Afghanistan there is also reason to fear that, with a decrease of the international community's interest in the political situation in the country, the number of infrastructure projects might drastically decrease, along with the willingness to support them. Some things will depend on whether the migrant organisations manage to become well-enough established in the field of co-operative international and developmental political work to survive such a period of scant attention.

In summary, the observation that political conflicts in the country of origin can lead to (new) identifications with it and the increased involvement of expatriates in infrastructure projects has been confirmed in numerous studies on migrant transnationalism (for example, in the considerable literature on the Tamil). At present, political conflicts are no longer pure domestic political affairs of the states involved; they are also an object of international politics and the media. Instable states capture the attention of international organisations, including organisations oriented towards developmental policy. This contributes essentially to the political contexts in which the migrants are strongly mobilised to confront issues in their countries of origin. The productivity of this involvement – and its ability to address problems – depends on the social constellations in the homeland, the migration history and the level of social integration of migrants in the receiving country, as well as the migrants' resources and the international resonance with which their projects are met.

3.3. Political Participation of the Migrant in the Countries of Origin

There have been some studies on the transnational political involvement of migrants.[40] On the one hand, it is maintained that political migrant assemblies ought to be viewed as autonomous transnational actors, which now wield strong influence over politics in their countries of origin (Koopmans; Statham, 2003 and Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2002). On the other hand, other studies focus on the "Diaspora politics" of the country of origin and maintain that the policy in the country of origin aims at influencing the type of political participation of expatriates as well as its intensity (Frykman, 2002 and Koser, 2002, also Wayland, 2004). Our pilot study shows that both the first and the second claim can be shown to be correct, depending on which type of migrant community one studies. What is known as Diaspora politics exercises only a limited influence on the migrant networks, which are formed in connection with professional identity, social strata or common business interests. Under certain conditions, these networks can operate as independent political actors within the country of origin. However, if the migrant networks are the result of political conflicts in the homeland, the Diaspora politics exercises great influence over them.

In our pilot study the political participation of migrants in their country of origin is closely studied in relation to two cases – Serbia and Egypt. The Afghan case is not taken into consideration regarding this issue. For one, this is because we largely only have access to secondary analyses of the political participation of the Afghans living in Germany. During the data collection phase, we could not locate political associations or individual political activists. For another, there is a lack of data on Afghanistan's Diaspora policy. By contrast, we have a great deal of material on Egypt and Serbia, because we were able to carry out expert interviews in both of these countries and gather relevant documents on the Diaspora policies. Besides that, Egypt and Serbia serve as paradigmatic cases for the argumentation of this section: The Serbian migrants living in Germany are very interested in Serbia's politics. The political participation of the Egyptians, by contrast, consists merely of lobbying work for their own elite networks, and it is little influenced by Egypt's Diaspora policy. So, Egypt and Serbia serve as two contrasting examples of the types of political participation of migrants. An analysis of them consequently points to the factors that drive or impede the political participation of migrants in their countries of origin. This analysis shows that the way that political migrants participate is connected to the way the respective migrant network develops and functions. In relation to the situations in Egypt and Serbia, in what follows we will describe how the political activities of migrants and the Diaspora politics of the respective country of origin are related to one another.

3.3.1. Egypt

a) Political participation of the migrants

Egyptian migrants living in Germany who spoke with us react to politics in their country of origin primarily with a view to opportunities. Many of them view themselves as critical of their regimes and as oriented towards democracy, but they lack the ability to translate their views into political action. Because many Egyptian migrants have become naturalised, Egyptians in Germany wield no mentionable influence on the elections. Egyptian organisations in Germany that we got to know also assume a politically opportunistic posture towards the present

[40] Eva Estergaard-Nielsen (2003) provides an overview of the current stand of research on political migrant transnationalism.

constellations of political power. Highly qualified migrants tend to focus on developing political contacts rather than on confrontations with power. So, too, Egyptian religious associations in Germany officially declare themselves to be apolitical. Thus the Coptic church in Germany distances itself from questions of Egyptian politics. It is thought better to keep peace with the government than to be confrontational: "for if Copts abroad stirred things up too much, then things would get worse, not better, for the brothers and sisters in Egypt."[41]

This political opportunism of the highly qualified Egyptian migrants, especially of the Copt minority, is not a matter of course. In the USA and the United Kingdom, Egyptian organisations with clear political goals for their country of origin have been organised. In the USA, for example, a Coptic organisation is active, which primarily works to combat the discrimination against Copts, but which also demands human rights and democratisation in Egypt (Brainard, 2003). In particular, Copts from North America seem to be politically active; and the Egyptian government has taken note of this. Many of our interview partners pointed out that one of the most important people in the ministry which Egyptians have set up specifically to deal with expatriates has traditionally been a Copt. Our interview partners concluded from this that he or she was provided with such an important position "so that Copts abroad, especially in the USA, would cause fewer problems", in other words, to guarantee secure deliberations with the Copt minority abroad.

A possible explanation for the fact that Egyptians living in Germany show more political opportunism than those living in America is the different migration structures dominant in these two countries. While it was primarily highly qualified Egyptians who came to Germany, the immigration to the USA and Canada, in particular by the Copts, was more politically charged. The Egyptians in America have thus tended more often to form organisations in accord with political objectives.

Despite their opportunistic mindset, Egyptian migrants in Germany are not politically passive. Their political participation turns out to be in the form of lobbying. Some highly qualified migrants pursuing pragmatic political goals in Egypt have aligned themselves with the businessmen of Egyptian origin who are active in Germany and Egypt. The association of Egyptian businessmen has established contact to politics in order to be able to achieve the interests of these highly qualified migrants. By taking care of some of the work of important officials in Egypt or providing them with information and expertise on certain matters of pertinence to their districts, they have been won over. Experts from abroad have been obtained to spur on certain solutions to problems, and they even provide officials help in preparing their speeches for their visits to Germany. In return, the officials offer their support. This primarily consists in "PR for the association" within the government and in the public sphere, which often bears fruit. One exemplary case is the initiative of some Egyptian natural scientists who were active in Germany and needed financial assistance to establish an institute for solar energy in Egypt. The association of Egyptian businessmen helped in the preparations for the opening of the German University in Cairo. It negotiated an agreement with the Egyptian minister president at the time to address a public letter to the German chancellor, who was expected in Cairo, primarily concerned with German assistance to Egypt. The research

[41] One certainly can find politically opposing views and action in the Muslim associations. The Islamic conservatives, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, constitute an important political counterbalance to the residing government in Egypt. It can be presumed that the organisations associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, such as the IGD, support the political opposition in Egypt in one way or another. However, this support is informal. We were not able to find Muslim organisations in Germany whose official reason for existence was to organise and support the political resistance in Egypt.

into solar energy was cited as the main focus of assistance. The German chancellor thereupon pledged to make €10 million available for this purpose.

The lobbying activity of highly qualified Egyptians from the Diaspora differs from typical lobbying because it is established solely through informal channels and contact with particular individuals (and not with political parties as occurs in Germany). However, the informality and the strong personalisation of the political contacts harbours a problem. The political influence built upon mutual favours is lost when there are changes among governmental leaders. For this reason, for example, only part of the €10 million that the chancellor pledged to the institute founders for research purposes was received. If old contacts break down, new ones must be painstakingly re-established. This kind of lobbying requires enormous social resources and is thus dependent on the personal involvement and influence of individuals from the Diaspora. It is less effective because, in politics, long-term trusting relationships of this kind are difficult to establish.

b) Egypt's Diaspora politics

The Egyptian government was early to recognise the benefits of the immigration of Egyptian labourers. For one, immigration eased structural problems in the Egyptian labour market. For another, the regular remittances of labourers living abroad were an important source of currency influx (Zohry, 2003). In 1981 the Federal Ministry for Migration Issues was established. It mainly attended to the temporary migrants to other Arab states. A further objective was to strengthen the relationships to economically successful Egyptians in Europe and North America (cp. Sawi, 2005). The ministry mainly focussed on promoting the interests of the wealthy and highly qualified migrants in Egyptian business and involving these migrants in economic activities. The ministry was much less interested in the political participation of the migrants (cp. Fargues, 2005). In 1996 the Ministry for Migration Issues was dismantled. The responsibility for migration issues was transferred to the Ministry of Labour. In this way a new administrative body thus arose: The Ministry of Manpower and Immigration, whose immigration department is responsible for the contact to the Diaspora.

None of our active interview partners in Egypt had contact with the Migration Ministry or later to the immigration department. Many indicated that the activity of the ministry was not important for them. In fact, little of the ministry's activity addresses Egyptians living Germany. The person in charge was insufficiently informed about the Egyptian population in Germany. The ministry boasted two projects at the time of the interview. Both were initiated and financed by the Italian government and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). They were accordingly directed at the Egyptians in Italy. One result of these projects was the Diaspora Internet site of the Ministry, addressing all Egyptians living abroad. However, our interview partner was unaware of the existence of the Internet site. In the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Insurance, there are also bodies concerned with Diaspora Egyptians. However, no Diaspora projects of any substance appear to have been initiated by these bodies.

In Egyptian political history, the 1990s are known for the liberalisation of the economic sector. A liberalisation measure from 1997 was related, among other things, to the adoption of an investment law. On the basis of this law, a new ministry (the *General Authority for Investment and Free Zones, [GAFI*) was established. The task of this ministry consisted above all in the active acquisition of foreign investment. Among others, Egyptians abroad were targeted for the activities of this ministry. Thus, here, too, a Diaspora sector was established in

the ministry, but so far it has concentrated on affluent migrants in the USA. This is probably related to personal contacts of certain ministry officials to migrants in the USA. Beyond that, according to statements of the team responsible for the Diaspora, American Egyptians are extremely well-organised and thus easy to identify. In the New York area, the ministry carried out surveys with the Egyptian Diaspora and organised an informative meeting on business interests for some of the most important Egyptians. However, the GAFI has not yet worked with European Egyptians. The ministry also has access to little information about Egyptian migrants in Europe, and in particular in Germany. Egyptian businessmen from Germany who aspire to gain political influence in Egypt through lobbying indicated that they ran into problems when taking up contact with the ministry. In the framework of the research interviews, however, no particular data is noted on this.

The *National Union of Egyptians Abroad* is a further organisation that strives to act on the part of Egyptians abroad. While it is officially registered as a NGO, in fact, it is under the care of the Egyptian president. Until recently its main work consisted in organising an annual congress of Egyptians abroad. However, in the past two years, this congress has not taken place. This was said to be due to the suspicion of political disloyalty among the Diaspora, which led to the withdrawal of the Egyptian president's support.

It is clear that none of the attempts of the Egyptian government related to Diaspora politics has thus far reached the Egyptians in Germany. The Diaspora's strategies of informal lobbying have been effective. These even extend to contacts at the Egyptian embassy in Germany. Besides serving its underlying function of offering citizens registration, protection and national representation, it is also a relevant contact address for the Egyptian Diaspora. It cultivates contacts to Egyptian organisations and enterprises in Germany. The embassy informs involved Egyptians about which infrastructure projects in Egypt are worth supporting. Ambassadors are often invited to association meetings or asked to give speeches there. Personal friendships are cultivated between the Egyptian migrants in Germany and the ambassadors. However, the access to the embassy is limited to the elite among the Egyptian migrants in Germany.

3.3.2. Serbia

The political activities of the Serbians living in Germany that are directed towards Serbia can hardly be separated from the Diaspora policies of Yugoslavia and later of Serbia, either historically or presently. Already in the 1970s, Yugoslavian guest workers organised under the initiation of the Yugoslavian consulates and stood in close contact with one another. At the beginning of the 1990s, Yugoslavian guest worker associations separated into their ethnic constituents. However, new migrant organisations also came into existence. Both Serbian clubs and other migrant organisations were politically active in the 1990s. Almost all Serbian organisations in Germany took a stand on the political situation in Serbia. This interest in the political occurrences in their country of origin has still not diminished. In principle, all of our interview partners were informed about the politics in Serbia and showed at least a "passive" interest in political participation (as voters). However, only a few of those we interviewed were among the political activists "from the Diaspora". The few activists among them were members, or founders, of migrant organisations that pursued political objectives. Today they are also trying to have an impact on Serbia's politics. They are especially interested in questions concerning the relationship between expatriates and the Serbian state.

Serbia's Diaspora policy knew to exploit the migrants' interest in politics. In the 1990s the Yugoslavian consulates collaborated to reawaken the national myth in the Diaspora. While the relationship of the Serbian state to the migrant organisations in Germany was severed after the fall of the Milosevic government, it was renewed again in 2004. With the new Ministry for Diaspora, a renewed attempt is being made to gain the favour of Serbian activists in Germany (and other countries). And this attempt has not remained without consequences.

a) Political Activities of Serbians in Germany and the Serbian Diaspora policy

The phase of political mobilisation: During the 1990s Serbian life in Germany met with massive upheavals. Against the background of the rediscovery of national identities and the democratisation in Yugoslavia, these organisations focussed on "the national question" and the future of the political system in Serbia. While nearly all of them were democratically oriented, nearly all of them were also positive about the reawakening of Serbian nationalism. In this initial mobilisation phase, newly founded Serbian organisations were mainly concerned with cultivating their own ethnic roots. They established new church communities and organised folklore festivities and concerts with folk singers from Serbia. These sorts of activities helped them gain the favour of many Serbians living in Germany. The number of Serbian migrants participating in these events was so large that it is nearly possible to speak of a mass mobilisation.

Yugoslavian consulates showed a particular interest in the new migrant organisations. They thus maintained a list of the active Serbian clubs in Germany and regularly attended club meetings. Embassy and consulate officials were befriended with some of the club activists. In addition, the consulates attempted to support the club activities. For example, they assisted in arranging folk singers or folk groups for the club events. Beyond the activities related to cultivating their own ethnic identity, in particular, highly qualified Serbians in Germany, but also throughout Europe, met within the framework of "discussion forums". There it was possible to engage in exchanges on political ideas or, for example, the role of Serbian expatriates in the process of political renewal.

The rediscovery of the ethnic identity of Serbian migrants and the simultaneous political mobilisation of them for their country of origin served as fruitful ground for the Yugoslavian Diaspora politics. As one of our interview partners expressed it: "Milosevic knew very well to exploit the Diaspora." For one, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Milosevic government announced a program able to be characterised as "loans for the fatherland". The program solicited for state investment funds with attractive interest rates, which migrants were to invest in. Serbians abroad invested in these funds. With this money, the Milosevic government subsidised the ailing large scale industry. For another, as he later boasted, the money also was spent for military activities in Croatia and Kosovo (Hockenos, 2003)**.** Neither the first nor the second "investment strategy" was profitable. The migrants' money was thus lost in a collapsing system.

Through monetary investments, the Diaspora was not just an (involuntary) financial supporter of the Milosevic government. Politically active migrant organisations also functioned as a mouthpiece for Serbia at a time of political isolation and during the Kosovo war. When the situation in Yugoslavia escalated, numerous migrant organisations began to publicly fight "against the defamation of Serbia". They organised demonstrations and appeals, wrote public letters and organised discussions with German politicians. Above all, they wanted to

counter what they perceived to be the one-sided reporting on the political situation in Yugoslavia. Many also attempted to get their own views of the situation in Yugoslavia across. However, these public actions had comparatively little effect. The majoritarian German public stance was that Serbian nationalism was one of the decisive causes for the political conflict in Yugoslavia; and the actions of the migrant organisations were perceived as support for the Milosevic regime.

The increasing gravity of the political situation in Serbia at the end of the 1990s, together with the symbolic recognition of the politically committed migrants on the part of the Serbian government, led to a de facto increase in the migrants' political influence in Serbia. In 1999 a Diaspora conference was organised in Belgrade. There, representatives from American and European migrant organisations met. They established a Council for the Diaspora, which was to be responsible for the concerns of Serbians abroad and was formally affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soon afterwards, Milosevic was deposed. The oppositional politician, Zoran Zizic, became prime minister. However, the Zizic government had little interest in the concerns of the Diaspora.

The Zizic era, the period of disappointment: The Zizic government reinterpreted the political role of the expatriate organisations. The foreign Serbians were viewed as Milosevic supporters. The relationships to them were more or less severed. For example, although the consulates stood in close contact to the Serbian organisations before 1999, they had hardly any interest in co-operating with Serbian clubs when they resumed their work in Germany. Now Serbian clubs were viewed as groups of throwbacks, of hardly any use. The relationships of the Serbian clubs to the consulates have still not recovered.

The political expectations of the involved Serbians from Germany were not fulfilled. The Council for the Diaspora was hardly able to accomplish anything in the Zizic era. The Zizic government also showed little interest in appointing other political representatives of the Diaspora. This especially disappointed the migrants who had been in the opposition and had tended to support Zizic. In addition, they were upset by the results of the long sought democratisation. According to our interview partners, the political system established in Serbia was beset with nepotism. The distribution of power was organised such that individual parties directly took over certain governmental departments. Nearly all of the administrative posts were assigned to someone on the basis of loyalty to "the party dominant in the respective ministry". In this type of a system, political contacts and party membership were what counted. In isolated cases, migrants who were close to certain parties or who had relationships with high-ranking people were able to tap these relationships for their own purposes. However, most Serbians living Germany found it difficult to gain access to these political networks. This can be seen, in particular, in the relationship of the Serbian parties to their party members in Germany.

A network of politically active Serbians who were supportive of a particular Serbian party arose in Germany as early as the 1990s. Activists in these networks were often party members in Serbia. They supported campaigns for local, regional or national elections and operated in Germany for their parties. However, the experience of one party group in Germany shows that the contact of the migrants to their comrades in Serbia was one-sided. The government showed the Diaspora party very little recognition. This is evidenced by the fact that the migrant groups were in no way integrated into the organisational structure of the party, and their members had little chance for a political career in the party. The reason for this was that party functionaries did not permit any competition from abroad. As a result, none of the

party members from the Diaspora were elected to the Serbian Parliament. The party did use the political commitment of the migrants, but it did not allow them access to the domestic political networks and thus to political influence in Serbia.

The rebirth of the Serbian Diaspora politics after 2004: With the new shift of power in Serbia in 2004, the government rediscovered the political and economic power of the Diaspora. For one, migrants were able to take part in the election in 2004. For another, with Prime Minister Kustunica's entry into power, a ministry was created to support the concerns of Serbians abroad. However, this new attempt of the Serbian government to mobilise Serbians living abroad for their country of origin is considered by many of the involved Serbians to have failed. They do not view the way the Serbian consulates prepared for voting or the activity of the Ministry for Diaspora as effective.

The percentage of migrants who voted in the first parliamentary election was incredibly low. According to the data of our interview partners who are among the Serbian political insiders, approximately 1,000 Serbians voted. Worldwide, outside of Serbia about 10,000 Serbians voted. However, this low participation rate in the election is not a sign of disinterest among the Diaspora Serbians. Rather, the Serbian administration was responsible for these desolate numbers. In particular, the consulates' lack of the ability to organise the elections was significant. Migrants were not informed of the possibility of voting. Absentee mail voting was not allowed, and it was necessary to appear at the consulate beforehand in order to register. Only after that was it possible to take part in the election. In sum, it was expected that the migrants independently inform themselves of the possibility of voting; after doing so, it was expected that they appear at the consulate at least two times (once to register and once to vote). Since there are few Serbian consulates in Germany, it can be assumed that only strong-headed political activists cast their votes.

With its programs, the Ministry for Diaspora that was established in 2005 is supposed to promote Diaspora programs in Serbia. However, at the time of this writing, the ministry has few concrete achievements. Thus, for example, the compulsory military service for second generation migrants is among the regularly discussed, yet still unresolved problems that complicates the relationships of the migrants to Serbia. The council has in fact striven to free second generation migrants from compulsory military service. The new Ministry for Diaspora has also promised to make improvements on this matter. Yet nothing has yet been done. A further controversial topic is related to the financing of language courses. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, courses for Serbians in their mother tongue were stopped. Now Serbian migrant activists are attempting to have them resumed. The ministry has declared that it would tend to the issue, but again there have been no visible results.

What are the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the new Serbian Diaspora politics? They lie in the structural particularities of the Serbian political system. As already mentioned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora are responsible for the contacts to the Diaspora. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does little in this regard. According to statements from our interview partners, this is due to the personnel's lack of expertise. The important posts in the consulates are usually appointed to civil servants from the political parties. The main reason for the appointments is apparent loyalty to the party and not necessarily professionalism. The Ministry for Diaspora is dominated by a small party that has little influence on present Serbian politics. The ministry thus has little leeway, and its politics is limited to symbolic gestures.

b) Effect of the symbolic politics of the Ministry for Diaspora

One focus of the Ministry for Diaspora are the Serbian migrants who have achieved professional success in the receiving countries and amassed financial resources. For these "elite among the Serbian Diaspora", the ministry, together with the Serbian Chamber of Commerce (SIHK), organises an annual Diaspora congress in Belgrade. Reciprocal recognition is usually the centrepiece here. Accordingly, "important Diaspora members" are distinguished for their commitment to Serbia. Beyond that, at regular intervals, the Ministry for Diaspora has begun to announce new plans, the Serbian Chamber of Commerce (SIHK) provides information about investment possibilities in Serbia. Because of all this, the Diaspora once again is beginning to feel accepted by the political community and is hoping for support from the Serbian government.

A further activity of the Ministry for Diaspora consists in visits from officials of different governmental departments, together with representatives of the SIHK, to representatives of Serbian organisations in different states of Europe, North America and Australia. As a rule, during such visits, personal contacts are cultivated. Some relationships have proven to be especially beneficial for the later economic activities of migrants in Serbia. However, neither long-term infrastructure projects nor political decisions favourable for the Serbian Diaspora have resulted from such meetings.

A summary of the activities of the Ministry for Diaspora shows that it is mainly concerned with symbolic politics. It does no more than rhetorically recognise the Diaspora and facilitate the cultivation of social contacts. However, new informal contacts between Serbian businessmen from abroad, Serbian politicians and active Serbian migrants are a side-effect of this policy. Besides that, with the encouragement of the Ministry for Diaspora, Serbian migrants have once again begun to organise themselves in different kinds of associations. In 2006, the "Serbian Diaspora", a new assembly for the associations, was founded in Munich. The goal of the assembly is to strengthen the relationships of Serbians to their country of origin, to promote business and cultural relationships between Serbia and Germany and to organise infrastructure projects. In addition, in the north of Germany, a league of the Serbian Diaspora was also established with the aim of bringing together Serbians from eight northern German cities. At the European level, a Diaspora organisation has also been founded, which boasts of representing the Serbian Diaspora from many states at the EU. It is still too early to evaluate the potential and the effectiveness of these and other new organisations. However, it is clear that, with scant resources, the Serbian Diaspora politics has managed to enlist numerous Serbians abroad to politically support the country.

3.3.3. Case Comparison

The models of political participation among the Serbian and the Egyptian migrants differ intensely. Correspondingly, the possibilities of the country of origin having an effect on the migrant networks in Germany differ. The political participation of the Egyptian migrants is limited to the informal lobbying by Egyptian businessmen and highly qualified professionals abroad. To some extent, in Germany these migrants form an independent elite network. Through contacts to the Egyptian embassy and to important people in Egyptian politics, this elite network attempts to gain political influence. Here, the network pursues pragmatic political objectives (for example, the acquisition of money for their own projects, influence over political decisions, etc.). The programs of various organisations of the Egyptian government that conduct official Diaspora politics do not reach this network at all. The political organisa-

tions responsible for migrants tend to be reactive. They wait until the Diaspora take up contact, something which often occurs informally, through acquaintances. If this contact is not established, the official Diaspora programs are hardly able to generate their intended effects.

The political involvement of the migrant organisations of Serbians living in Germany is multi-layered and relatively intensive. Within the course of the 1990s, it assumed various forms: from PR work in favour of Yugoslavia's politics to assistance in setting up political parties and establishing their own "Diaspora committees" within the political landscape of Serbia. Because of the great interest in the political development of Serbia, the political measures addressing the Diaspora are very efficacious. However, the state actors responsible for the Diaspora only possess meagre political and financial resources, and they are therefore in no position to actively promote the interests of Serbians abroad in their country of origin. This is one important reason that they are virtually only engaged in symbolic politics, limited to cultivating contacts with important Serbians and Serbian organisations abroad and gestures of mutual recognition. What is amazing, however, is that the symbolic politics of the Serbian state appear to have had noteworthy effects. They contribute to the establishment of political relationships, with important repercussions for the economic activities of the Diaspora in Serbia. Beyond that, however, through the symbolic politics of the country of origin, new alliances of migrants have been established in the receiving countries; these migrants in fact feel obligated to support their homeland. How can the different patterns of the political participation of migrants in Serbia and Egypt be explained? In our opinion, the modes by which the respective migrant networks develop and function must be taken into account. Highly organised Egyptian networks in Germany are networks of the elite group of migrants into the education system, which, like Rotary Clubs, contribute to reproducing, stabilising and strengthening their own social position both in the receiving country and in their country of origin. Given this, it is not surprising that their political participation assumes the form of lobbying for their own interests. Serbian migrants were organised against the background of the Serbian political conflicts. Their networking and activities were stimulated by the newly inflamed Serbian nationalism at the beginning of the 1990s. One of the main objectives of their activities was therefore to promote Serbia's future development. This unfolded in the forms of individual and collective political participation typical for modern nation-states.

Further, the modes by which the respective migrant networks develop and function explain how susceptible to influence they are. Egyptian elite networks operate largely autonomously of the actors of Egyptian Diaspora politics. By contrast, however, Serbian migrant networks are very hopeful about the prospects for Serbia. Despite several disappointing experiences, political input from their country of origin has not lost importance. The fact that the ethnic-national identity of these migrants is one of the few legitimising bases for their self-organisation in Germany appears to be responsible for this. Political signals addressed to them from their country of origin thus assume considerable importance.

These considerations, based on the exemplary study of two cases, offer a starting point for further reflections on the effectiveness of the political efforts of migrants' countries of origin to involve their Diaspora in the domestic political life or to influence the activities of the Diaspora thataffect development. According to the results of our study, the effectiveness of these efforts appears to be largely dependent on whether they are able to decipher the modes by which the networks of migrants develop and function. This task is made more difficult by the fact that the migrant networks can differ considerably from country to country.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The following general conditions, which underlie the analysis of the development contributions of Diaspora communities, were points of reference in the examination of our case studies: (a) the migrants themselves (i.e. their human capital); (b) the reasons for their migration (work, education, flight, family/marriage); (c) the social conditions in the receiving country and their social integration there; (d) the social conditions in their country of origin and the position of the migrants or their families there; and (e) the social forms of organisation of migrants in their receiving country (structure of the Diaspora).

4.1. Conclusions

Depending on the Diaspora community, the variables of this frame of reference are combined in different ways, as is evident from the communities we looked at in Germany.

Egyptians

The Egyptians are mainly elite upper-middle-class migrants into the education system, who have come to Germany since the 1950s. A higher percentage of Egyptians are university educated specialists. A relatively high percentage are naturalised, are in German-Egyptian marriages and are well-integrated into the receiving society. As a rule, highly qualified migrants of Egyptian origin are organised in professional associations and Egyptian culture clubs. Similarly to Rotary Clubs, these also serve to reproduce, stabilise and strengthen their own elite networks. In comparison to the other two countries we examined, relatively stable political and economic conditions are dominant in Egypt, connected with numerous possibilities for profitable investments. A range of Egyptians take advantage of these possibilities. We thus find a considerable number of profit-oriented investments, as well as individually initiated activities that contribute to the collective good. These are above all in the prestigious areas of education and science.

At the same time, the general conditions under which these productive investments and activities in Egypt occur considerably limit their developmental potential and prevent many Egyptians from abroad from becoming involved. These concern problems with the transparency of the legal system, the lack of production and quality standards, as well as the existence of clientelism. The central importance that networks play in decision-making and reaching agreements entails the danger that decisions and processes will loose their standing when the networks break down, for example, when political officials loose their offices. These networks are therefore often unreliable and insecure.

Afghans

The first Afghan migrants, who came to Germany in the 1950s, were mainly businessmen, especially carpet dealers, or students from various disciplines, but especially medicine and engineering. In the wake of the war in 1979 and the numerous political power shifts following it, Afghans with the necessary economic and social resources for the escape route came to Germany. Initially, members of the western-oriented educated elite (university professors, teachers, students) sought asylum in Germany. After the mujahideen came to power, members of the communist party also came. The Taliban regime triggered another wave of migration, largely of members of the urban middle class as well as ethnic and reli-

gious minorities. Given the differing motivations for the immigration from Afghanistan and the different social composition of the groups taking part in it, the Afghan Diaspora is very heterogeneous. Its members differ from one another considerably regarding religion, political orientation, educational background and social class membership.

Later waves of refugees were, and are, usually confronted with considerable difficulties integrating into Germany. These are related to their legal status and labour-market restrictions on their activity in Germany. There is also a failure to recognise their human capital. Increasingly, however, the second generation Afghan immigrants are successfully integrating into the German education system, and, according to the results of our study, they are also very interested in the developments in their country of origin.

The individual involvement in Afghanistan (e.g. with remissions and individual investments), and, more importantly, the collective involvement (through a number of associations and registered professional societies), began with the outbreak of the war in 1979. Over time, this intensified, and in wake of the political developments, it became particularly strong after 2001. Through more than two decades of war, major segments of the physical and social infrastructure of the country have been destroyed. The new Afghan state is not (yet) able to provide the public goods necessary to normalise social life. The Diaspora thus has the role of compensating for the deficits of the state by getting involved in infrastructure projects in the areas of education, healthcare, science, girls' and women's advancement, humanitarian aid, transport, and energy and water provision. The increased involvement of the Diaspora in Afghanistan has undoubtedly been stimulated by the degree of international attention (especially directly after the NATO deployment in 2001). In this context, successful financial and political resources from national and international donators, as well as other actors such as NGOs, were able to be mobilised and at times linked in synergetic relationships with projects of the Diaspora.

Against this background, the urgent developmental policy question is whether the migrant organisations and other relevant participants will manage to stabilise the current involvement at a level able to maintain what has been achieved. This is necessary to drive the development necessary in the country. Yet it could be endangered should the degree of international political, and media, attention decrease further and, with it, the willingness to make resources available.

Serbians

The immigration of Serbians to Germany – initially as Yugoslavians – began in the 1950s with the guest worker agreement and continued on the basis of this program until the recruitment stop in 1973. Their qualification structure included a range of unskilled and skilled labour. However, a large number of the less qualified workers returned to Serbia after the recruitment stop. Subsequent to that, the immigration of Serbians to Germany was largely the result of family reunifications. Besides the guest workers, since the 1950s a small yet steady number of Serbian intellectuals had also immigrated, mostly opponents of the communist regime.

As a rule, Yugoslavians and, later, Serbians have organised in clubs (often sport or culture clubs), which have concentrated on the life of Serbian migrants in Germany. With the increase in ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia and the ensuing collapse of the country, the national consciousness of the Serbians in Germany also increased. Serbian clubs were founded in

the place of Yugoslavian ones, and these were mainly dedicated to cultivating the newly found national identity.

Before the outset of the conflict in Yugoslavia, individual investments in Yugoslavia, in particular, for the acquisition of real estate, were the focus of the Diaspora's activities there. (This is now also the case for Serbians.) In contrast to the Egyptians and the Afghans, the Yugoslavian Diaspora tended not to be much involved in infrastructure development projects in their country of origin. This was different during the war that led to the dissolution of the country and during the Kosovo conflict. Here, the Serbian Diaspora, similar to the Afghans, if less extensively, acted on the basis patriotic commitments: To compensate for the state, which was tied up in the war, it became involved in various projects, providing healthcare, water, transport and humanitarian relief.

As opposed to the situation of the Afghans, the weak state was able to patriotically mobilise the Serbian migrants to support it. The activities of the Afghans, by contrast, have been much more strongly characterised by the breakdown of the state; thus their activities are not even directed at the state. The Serbians in Germany, by contrast, were publicly involved in attempting to correct what they viewed to be the one-sided view of Serbia in the international press. They were all the more disappointed when, after the deposition of Milosevic and the end of the Kosovo conflict, the successor government depreciated this involvement and largely severed their political influence.

Only very recently, with the 2005 founding of the Serbian Ministry for Diaspora, has there been a renewed attempt to activate the economic and political potential of the Serbian Diaspora. This shows that for Serbian migrants – in stark contrast to the migrants in the other two countries investigated – the forms of organisation, as well as the political orientation of their involvement in their country of origin, are strongly determined by the political developments in that country. The majority of Serbian migrants in Germany are labour migrants, who have indeed settled in Germany, but who can nevertheless be strongly mobilised to support the Serbian state and its politics, especially in periods of conflict.

The cases we have studied show clearly that in order to be able to recognise where developmental policy assistance might be applied, a precise case-by-case analysis is needed. This should refer to the points of conjuncture of the different frameworks at various points of time and to their combined effect on the mobilisation of the Diaspora communities. On the basis of this, action can be recommended for different areas:

A) the promotion of economic activities,
B) the promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure,
C) the promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora,
D) the promotion of the existing Diaspora structures,
E) the development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country, as well as
F) international collaboration.

In what follows, different ideas for these areas will be outlined.

4.2. Recommended Action

A) The promotion of economic activities

- In numerous interviews it was pointed out that the *failure to maintain quality specifications* and the *lack of production standards* in Egypt and Serbia were severe obstacles to the expansion of exports to Germany and the EU. An already existing assistance program backed by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to promote the Serbian export industry aims to inform Serbian producers about EU-compatible product standards and to advise them of ways to achieve them. A similar program would also be interesting for Egypt. Here, striving for collaboration with specialists from the Diaspora to promote quality in their country of origin might be considered, e.g. in the form of public-private partnerships.
- In Afghanistan, the development of the *energy sector* is of central importance for increasing the prospects of success of ongoing and planned infrastructure and economic activities. Afghan engineers with various specialisations from the Diaspora are already active in this field. They mainly want to be better integrated into the German co-operative development work and to procure professional know-how from collaboration partners. Here, in the future, a special emphasis could be placed on the collaboration between Diaspora engineers and the GTZ in the area of regenerative energy, since the natural preconditions for this are optimal in Afghanistan. A practical proposal is to collect systematic and extensive wind data in various regions in order to test the efficiency of the use of windmills.
- A similar interest exists for the *agricultural sector*. In the Afghan Diaspora in Germany, there are numerous agricultural engineers who have already conducted studies on regenerating the agriculture sector and who could be appointed as experts in German cooperative development work. Because Afghanistan is an agrarian country, the agricultural sector is of major importance for economic regeneration.
- Besides that, more attention should be paid to *activities in rural areas* of Afghanistan (as opposed to cities). Many of the foreign NGOs are predominantly active in Kabul. Because of their specific knowledge of the regions they are from, Afghan Diaspora organisations appear to be more apt to assume the risks of establishing projects in rural areas. Supporting these projects would therefore particularly benefit the development in rural areas.

B) The promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure

- It would be possible to develop models to finance *fellowship programs* to guarantee access to institutions such as the *German University in Cairo* for all those interested, and not merely for those who have the necessary financial resources available. The same applies for the German schools in Cairo.
- In Afghanistan, first of all, support appears to be necessary in *re-establishing and developing the educational sector*. The illiteracy rate in Afghanistan is among the highest in the world; thus education is of central importance. In this context, it is necessary to support both the construction of school buildings and the development and provision of course materials. However, the greatest need is for assistance in the *training of teaching personnel*. In line with the curriculum drawn up by the Afghan Ministry of Education, new teaching personnel must be trained or the current teachers must be newly trained. To of-

fer qualifications on site, suitably qualified people from the Diaspora in Germany could be temporarily mobilised. Here, links should be established with the already existing co-operative work with aid organisations that have participated in the Iserlohn conference mentioned in the text; for some time, they have already dealt with the issues related to teacher qualification.

- *Improving the healthcare provision* in Afghanistan ought to be a further focus. Here, for one, *clinics and emergency rooms are inadequately equipped*, for example, with medical equipment, medicine, nursing resources (e.g. beds, wheelchairs). Those interviewed also clearly indicated that, in addition to that, the logistical means for transporting the medical equipment are often lacking. These things could serve as important starting points for projects aimed at improving the healthcare sector in Afghanistan. For another thing, however, in particular, *qualified personnel* is lacking. Afghan associations of medical doctors in Germany, for example, make fellowships available for the further education or specialisation of doctors from Afghanistan, who attend courses in Germany. They also provide advanced training in their areas of specialisation in Afghanistan. These activities are sensible approaches to improving the qualifications of medical doctors in Afghanistan, and they could be further developed with the proper form of financial support. In this way, for example, the exchange of knowledge about modern medical standards at international congresses could be supported.
- Here it is in generally to be noted that the promotion of the *exchange and transfer of knowledge*, in particular in healthcare, but also in other areas, would be desirable for all three countries. This can occur at diverse levels (for students, lecturers or professors). Various forms of exchanging and transferring knowledge are mentioned in our interviews. In general, there is a strong interest in this – and a particularly strong potential for it – among the Diaspora communities in Germany.

C) The promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora

- Our analysis shows that the Serbians have a strong political interest in their homeland. However, as was described in the study, due to the effort required, the majority of Serbians in Germany did not participate in the 2004 *elections*, despite possessing the legal right to vote. It is common in international collaboration (in particular within the framework of measures promoting democratisation) to fall back on the expertise of international organisations, which, for their part, rely on national experts (e.g. the expertise of the OSCE in election observation): accordingly, the bilateral support of the Serbian government in developing an efficient voting procedure should be considered (e.g. by means of absentee mail voting).

D) The promotion of the existing Diaspora structures

In the findings of a recent Diaspora study (De Haas: June 2006), among other things, the author identifies the following point of departure for the successful implementation of policies in this field: "*Recognising that migrants are already mobilised for development on their own initiative rather than 'mobilising diasporas', development actors themselves should be 'mobilised' to engage with and to learn from diasporas in development cooperation so as to establish a genuine two-way working relationship."*

On the basis of our findings, we can only agree. It is important to support the existing structures and networks and not to presume that it is necessary to externally mobilise the migrants. We thus suggest:

- For the Egyptian Diaspora, which is relatively well-endowed with resources and therefore less in need of financial and institutional support, it is worth considering whether the *promotion of reciprocal contacts and the flow of information between official Egyptian competent authorities and the Egyptian Diaspora should be emphasised*; for our study shows that neither the potential of the Egyptians in Germany nor the means for dealing with their specific problems are addressed in Egyptian policy.
- The loss associated with a "*quasi-return*" presents a problem. Migrants who establish their own businesses in Egypt, and thus decrease the amount of time they reside in Germany, fall out of contact with their networks (the work of the associations). However, precisely these successful entrepreneurs can function to multiply knowledge about the forms of involvement in Egypt, as well as the possibilities and the prospects of this involvement. Businessmen who are now successful in Egypt, for example, can offer the best information about where investments might be made and which form they might take; or in certain cases, they can provide information about which difficulties might be expected. These businessmen could help establish interest and confidence in investing in Egypt.
- In the Egyptian Diaspora, there are also individual actors who are interested, competent and *committed*, but who *do not have access to the necessary financial resources*. Here, too, it would be possible to provide support.
- Strong *fractions, such as those within the Afghan Diaspora*, hamper effective involvement relevant for development because the activities that are being engaged in are often not bundled where it appears sensible for them to be. Individual relief organisations often work independently of one another or in competition with one another. One exception is DAMF e.V., which includes numerous associations for medical doctors. Exchanges regarding the work of the individual associations and their projects are also seldom. One forum for such exchanges among the NGOs that are active in Afghanistan does organise a conference in the city of Iserlohn. However, this only takes place once per year. Here a *co-ordination site* to organise the exchanges of and links between work and ongoing projects could serve as a corrective.
- Beyond that, an increase in the *professionalisation of Diaspora projects* would be desirable. This could be achieved, for example, by offering (country-specific) seminars on fund raising, which provide the needed knowledge and competences for dealing with potential donors, procedures, personnel management, the recruiting of volunteers, etc.
- Special attention should be paid to *second generation immigrants*. Here, in particular, those in the Afghan and Egyptian Diaspora have a strong interest in being involved in their respective homeland. They also clearly have a potential that should be taken seriously. In addition, precisely the second generation Afghan migrants tend to be willing to shed the prejudices against other Afghan groups. Numerous of our interview partners emphasised this potential of the younger generation and ascribed this to their modern education. On the basis of their solid knowledge of the language and culture of both countries (Afghanistan and Germany), with the appropriate support, some of them could come to function as intercultural intermediaries. However, second generation Serbians and the increasing number of Serbian student migrants could also come to assume such

an intermediary role in the future. Here, summer schools could serve as catalysers by bringing second generation Serbians and the student migrants from Serbia into contact with one another and specifically making this an issue.

- Within the framework of our study, our interview partners, in particular those from Afghanistan and Serbia, expressed a strong *interest in further information on the structure of the Diaspora*, the breadth of its activities and the various activities in their country of origin that are based in it. There are in fact numerous newspapers, newsletters, websites and so forth, as well as television and radio stations in the respective languages. However, amidst the over-supply and the failing resources for distribution, there appears to be a need for a structured forum to communicate the available potential. In this context, our Serbian interview partners suggested the idea of opening an *information centre*, which would provide information on the possibilities for involvement (the possibilities for assistance and the focus of investments). The information on the possible involvement and the successful projects in existence would facilitate the organisations' *evaluation of their own work*; such a centre could also serve as something of an *exchange for best practices*.

E) The development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country

In principle, the migrants who contribute the most to the development of their countries of origin are those who, on the basis of *a permanent residence permit* and the *equal opportunity to access the labour market*, have acquired a good social standing in the receiving country and thus are well-integrated there. Insecure residence status and an insecure social position in the receiving country are accompanied by lower economic and intellectual potential. As a consequence of years of having remained outside of the labour force, the limited access to certain professions and/or to further education, with time, the potential, the knowledge and the skills of many migrants lapse. As a result, their potential to contribute to the development of their country of origin *and* their receiving country also decreases.

- A *higher degree of integration*, as well as good social standing, contribute to the activities of the Diaspora members. The rights and limitations connected with a given residence status play an important role. It follows from what has been presented here that the potential of migration can only develop if all three parties are benefited: first the migrants; then the receiving countries due to social integration; and finally, on this basis, the country of origin because of the involvement, competence and wealth of resources of the migrants. As a consequence, it is of central importance to establish secure residence status. In our view, the integration of migrants would thus also promote "*brain circulation*".
- In this context, allowing *double citizenship* is important. The loss of citizenship in one's country of origin as a result of naturalisation often results in greater obstacles for those migrants who are later involved in their countries of origin: It can entail the loss of the right to vote and the loss or the right to acquire real estate, as well as cumbersome visa requirements to later enter the country. Allowing double citizenship can thus be an appropriate strategy for promoting the involvement of immigrants to Germany in their countries of origin.

As a consequence, a migration and integration policy with the objective of promoting the social integration of the migrants will at the same time promote the Diaspora migrants in their involvement with their countries of origin. Such a migration policy, which includes a comprehensive integration policy, is simultaneously a good developmental policy. It *taps the resources of those concerned* and attempts to mobilise them for development. In this context, it is significant to note our impression that many migrants in the Diaspora communities (and their networks) possess specific and valuable knowledge that ought to be taken account of in designing future developmental policy strategies. Thus, it would be valuable to reflect on the ways in which representatives of the Diaspora communities might be more strongly integrated into developmental policy bodies as advisors.

F) International co-operation

- Through remittances, the Diaspora members make a significant impact on their countries of origin. This issue is not only debated considerably within the major receiving countries, at the national level, but also at the international level. As many international organisations now advocate, it is important to develop transparent and cheaper systems for remittances. Insofar as the *remittances* affect the *development of the infrastructure* (especially in rural areas), co-financing programs might play the most important role here. This could, for example, build on the years of experience of the *tres por uno* program in Mexico or the EU financing programs. However, in order to establish confidence and stimulate investment, it is crucial that the project management be taken on by the local communities and/or the Diaspora community.
- In addition, an *international (or bilateral) exchange* with receiving countries that have larger Diaspora communities would also be sensible. For example, a comparison of the Serbian Diaspora living in the USA and in Germany could be productive. A focus on their impact on the development in Serbia could facilitate a more precise understanding of the relationship between the Diaspora and their countries of origin in general and of the significance of this for development in particular.

  Beyond that, in accord with the desires of members of the Egyptian Diaspora, the potentials connected with assisting the *international networking of the respective Diaspora* should be more fully integrated into bilateral or international discussions.

References

AASF (Afrikanisch-Asiatische Studienförderung e.V.) (2002) – Afghanistan – Hoffnung und Perspektiven. Jahrbuch 2002. Beiträge zu einem interkulturellen Wissenschaftsverständnis und zu den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. Frankfurt am Main: IKO-Verlag.

Adams, R. H. (2003) – International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Poverty Reduction Group, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Adamson, F. B. (2002) – "Mobilizing for the Transformation of Home. Politicized Identities and Transnational Practices". In New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home, edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 155 – 169.

AGEF (2002) – Analyse des Fachkräftepotenzials unter afghanischen Migrantinnen und Migranten in Deutschland: Ausgewählte Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen. Unpublished Study, commissioned by ZAV and the BMZ.

Al-Ali, N. (2002) – "Trans- or a-national? Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands". In New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home, edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 96 – 118.

Anderson, B. R. (1998) – The Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World. London & New York: Verso.

Anwar, M.; Blaschke, J.; Sander, Å. (2004) - State Policies Towards Muslim Minorities: Sweden, Great Britain and Germany. Final Report, Berlin.

Arendt-Rojahn, V.; Buchberger, E.; El-Mogaddedi, B.; Freckmann, H.; Pfaff, V. (2005) – Rückkehr nach Afghanistan. Unter welchen Umständen können Flüchtlinge zurückkehren? Report based on a study in Afghanistan, March/April 2005.

Balakrishnan, J. (2003) – "Capacity Development for RRR & Development in North and East of Sri Lanka". In "Wenn es in der Heimat um Krieg und Frieden geht: Die Rolle der Diaspora in Krisenentwicklung und ziviler Konfliktberatung". Documentation of a workshop in Loccum 70/03, edited by Jörg Calließ. Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, pp. 211 – 239.

Biao, X. (2005) – Promoting Knowledge Exchange through Diaspora Networks (The Case of People's Republic of China). Oxford: ESRC, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS): 101.

Bieber, F. (2005) – Nationalismus in Serbien vom Tode Titos bis zum Ende der Ära Milosevic. Wien: Österreichisches Ost- und Südosteuropa-Institut.

Bommes, M. (2003) – "Der Mythos des transnationalen Raumes. Oder: Worin besteht die Herausforderung des Transnationalismus für die Migrationsforschung?" In Migration im

Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat. Leviathan. Sonderheft 22, edited by Dietrich Tränhardt and Uwe Hunger. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 90 – 117.

Bommes, M. (1999) – Migration und nationaler Wohlfahrtsstaat. Ein differenzierungstheoretischer Versuch. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Braakmann, M. (2005) – Roots and Routes. Questions of Home, Belonging and Return in an Afghan Diaspora. Leiden University.

Brainard, L. A.; Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2003) – Digital Diasporas and Human Rights: Strengthening National Governments. In Occasional Paper Series, The GW Center for the Study of Globalization: 17.

Brieden, T. (1996) – Konfliktimport durch Immigration: Auswirkungen ethnischer Konflikte im Herkunftsland auf die Integrations- und Identitätsentwicklung von Immigranten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Hamburg: Kovac'.

Carling, N. (2005) – Migrant Remittances and Development Cooperation. International Peace Research Institute, Report I/2005, Oslo.

Cassanelli, L. (2001) – Diaspora und Entwicklung. Potenziale und Grenzen des disaporagestützten Entwicklungswegs. epd-Entwicklungspolitik 23/24.

Centlivres-Demont, M. (2000) – "Die afghanische Diaspora in Europa". In Afghanen im Exil. Identität und politische Verantwortung. Minutes of a workshop. Evangelische Akademie Iserlohn.

Central Intelligence Agency (2006) - The World Factbook 2006, Washington D.C.: CIA.

Cohen, R. (1999) – Global Diasporas. Oxon: Routledge.

Conversi, D. (2000) – "Central Secession: Toward a New Analytical Concept? The Case of Former Yugoslavia". In Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26(2): 333 - 357.

Daume, H. (2004) – "Afghanische Hindus und ihr Tempel in Hamburg-Rothenburgsort". In Ethnoscripts (6/2004), pp. 162-181.

De Haas, H. (2006) – Engaging Diasporas - How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries. International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. A study for Oxfam Novib, June 2006.

Delwari, N. (2004) – Migration and Development. Working with the Diaspora. The Effect of Immigrant Remittances on the Economy of Afghanistan.

ECORYS (Ed.) (2005) – Study on Improving the Efficiency of Workers' Remittances in Mediterranean Countries. Rotterdam: ECORYS.

Elwert, G. (2002) – "Unternehmerische Illegale. Ziele und Organisationen eines unterschätzten Typs illegaler Einwanderer". IMIS-Beiträge 19: 7 - 21.

European Council on Refugees and Exiles; ECRE (Ed.) (2001) – Presentation on Behalf of ECRE to European Union High Level Working Group on Afghanistan. www.ecre.org/speeches/hlwgafg.shtml.

Fair, C. (2005) – "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movement". In Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11:125 – 156.

Faist, T. (1997) – "Migration und Transfer sozialen Kapitals oder: Warum gibt es relativ wenige internationale Migranten?" In Transnationale Migration. Soziale Welt. Sonderband, edited by Ludger Pries. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 63 – 85.

Fargues, P. (2005) – How Many Migrants, from and to, Mediterranean Countries of the Middle East and North Africa? Florence, Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on international Migration: CARIM-AS 2005 16: 28.

Fargues, P. (Ed.) (2005) – Mediterranean Migration – 2005 Report. Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, European University Institute: Florence.

Frykman, M. P. (2002) – "Homeland Lost and Gained. Croatian Diaspora and Refugees in Sweden". In New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home, edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 118 - 138

Gaillard, J.; Gaillard, A. M. (1997) – "The International Mobility of Brains: Exodus or Circulation?" In Science, Technology and Society 2: 195 - 228.

Gehrig, T. (2004) – "Randzonen des Rechts. Afghanische Erfahrungen mit dem Asyl in Deutschland". In Ethnoscripts 6/2004 (1).

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (1995) – Fachkräfteprogramm Afghanistan. Final Report.

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (2004) – "Migration und Entwicklung". Expert meeting on "Kooperation mit der Diaspora - ein neuer Weg für die Internationale Zusammenarbeit?" 3/4 May 2004 Berlin.

Gesemann, F. (1995) – Ägyptische Migranten in Deutschland - Materialien zur Geschichte und Entwicklung einer arabischen Minderheit. Berlin: Edition Parabolis.

Glatzer B. (2005) – "Afghanistan – Staat im Umbruch". In Entwicklung & ländlicher Raum 6: 11-13.

Glatzer, B. (2003) – Studien zur länderbezogenen Konfliktanalyse: Afghanistan. Commissioned by FES and GTZ.

Glick-Schiller, N.; Basch, L.; Szanton, C. B. (1997) – "From Migrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration". In Internationale Migration, edited by Ludger Pries. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 121 – 141.

Global Commission on International Migration (2005) – Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action. Final report.

Glytsos, N. P. (1997) – "Remitting Behaviour of Temporary and Permanent Migrants: The Case of Greeks in Germany and Australia". Labour 11 (3): 409-435.

Goldring, L. (1997) – "Power and Status in Transnational Social Spaces". In Transnational Migration, edited by Ludger Pries. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 179 – 197.

Guarnizo, L. E.; Portes, A.; Haller, W. (2003) – "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants". In American Journal of Sociology 108: 1211 - 49.

Haberl, O. N. (1978) – Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien. Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und Rückführung. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

Haidari, M. A. (2004) – "Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Diaspora Role". In The Ashian Magazine 10 (09).

Hammar, T. (1989) – "State, Nation and Dual Citizenship". In Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, edited by Rogers W. Brubaker. Boston and London: University Press of America, pp. 81 - 97.

Hansen, P. (2004) – Migrant Remittances as a Development Tool: The Case of Somaliland. IOM Migration policy research. Working Papers Series 3.

Hillmann, F.; Hedwig, R. (1997) – "S(Z)eitenwechsel - Internationale Mobilität Hochqualifizierter am Beispiel Polen". In "Transnationale Migration", edited by Ludger Pries. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag, pp. 245 – 265.

Hockenos, P. (2003) – Homeland Calling. Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Horr, M.; Klein H. G., Pezaro A., Schönmeier, H. (1989) – Fachkräfteprogramm Afghanistan. Band III Kurzbericht. Saarbrücken: Universität des Saarlandes, Forschungsstelle für Entwicklungsplanung (SFE).

Hötzeldt, A.; Pugliese, E. (2004) – Draft Report. The Afghan Diaspora in Germany. Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung.

Hunger, U. (2003a) – "Brain Drain oder Brain Gain: Migration und Entwicklung". In Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, edited by Dietrich Thränhardt and Uwe Hunger. Leviathan. Sonderheft, pp. 58 – 76.

Hunger, U. (2003b) – "Migration im Wettbewerbstaat". Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Ibrahim, B.; Ibrahim, F. (2000) – "The Contribution of Immigrants towards Processes of Globalization in Germany - The Example of the Egyptian Copts". In Migration aus Nordafrika. Ursachen und Probleme, edited by M. Koller. Neuried: ars una, pp. 99 - 132.

Ibrahim, F. (2005 (forthcoming)) – "The Egyptian Coptic Diaspora in Germany - A Study in Local Cultural Vitality. Religion in the Context of African Migration", edited by A. Adogame and C. Weisskoppel. Bayreuth.

Internationaler Währungsfond (2005) – "Balance of payments statistics Yearbook 2005", New York: IWF.

IOM (2003) – "Data on Migration and Development Report". IOM's International Dialog on Migration, pp. 1 – 12.

IOM (2005) – International Dialogue on Migration; Mainstreaming Migration into Development Policy Agendas. In cooperation with the UK Department for International Development and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Results of a workshop held on 2-3 February 2005 in Geneva.

IOM (2005) – "Engaging Diasporas as Agents of Developments", result of a survey.

Jajayery, L. (2002) – "The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case Study". In International Migration 40 (5): 231-254.

Jelasic, R. (2004) – "Remittances: Macro, Micro, and Socioeconomic impact". Presentation at the expert meeting on "Kooperation mit der Diaspora - ein neuer Weg für die Internationale Zusammenarbeit?" 3./4. May 2004, GTZ, Berlin.

Jäger, T.; Reso, J. (1999) – "Zur sozialen Situation der bosnischen Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland". In: http://www.proasyl.de/lit/bosnien/text1.htm.

Koc, I.; Onan, I. (2004) – "International Migrants' Remittances and Welfare Status of the Left-Behind Families in Turkey". In International Migration Review 38(1): 78 - 113.

Koopmans, R.; Statham P. (2003) – "How National Citizenship Shapes Transnationalism: Migrant and Minority Claim-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands". In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 195 – 238.

Koser, K. (2002) – "From Refugees to Transnational Communities?" In New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home, edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 138 – 153.

Koser, K.; Van Hear, N. (2003) – "Asylum Migration and Implications for Countries of Origin". Discussion paper No. 2003/20. United Nations University. WIDER World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Levitt, P. (1998) – "Social Remittances: A Local-Level, Migration-Driven Form of Cultural Diffusion". In International Migration Review 32: 926 - 949.

Levitt, P. (2003) – "'You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant': Religion and Transnational Migration". In International Migration Review 37: 847 - 874.

Lucas, R. E. B.; Stark, O. (1985) – "Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana". In Journal of Political Economy 93 (5): 901-918.

Luhmann, N. (2000) – "Organisation und Entscheidung". Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Mahler, S. J. (1998) – "Theoretical and Empirical Contributions Toward a Research Agenda for Transnationalism". In Transnationalism from Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 64 – 103.

Malac'ic', J. (1996) – "Arbeitsmigration aus Ex-Jugoslawien". In Migration in Europa. Historische Entwicklung, aktuelle Trends und politische Reaktionen, edited by H. Fassmann and R. Münz. Frankfurt and New York: Campus, pp. 231 - 245.

Martin, P. L. (2004) – "Migration and Development: Toward Sustainable Solutions". Geneva: International Institut for Labour Studies: 29.

Massing, S. (2003) – "Der Afghanistan-Konflikt: Chronik der Ereignisse von 1973-2003". http://www.suedasien.net/laender/afghan/geschichte.htm.

Meyer, J. B. (2001) – "Network Approach versus Brain Drain: Lessons from the Diaspora". In International Migration 39: 91 - 111.

Münz, R.; Straubhaar, T.; Vadean, F.; Vadean, N. (2006) – "The Costs and Benefits of European Immigration". HWWI Policy Report No. 3 (forthcoming), Migration Research Group, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

Naby, E. (2005) – "The Afghan Diaspora: Reflection on the Imaged Country". In Central Asia and the Caucasus, pp. 169-183.

Nassery, H. G. (2003) – "The Reverse Brain Drain: Afghan-American Diaspora in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Reconstruction". www.aisk.org/reports/diaspora.pdf (14.11.2005).

Newland, K. (2003) – "Migration as a Factor in Development and Poverty Reduction". Migration Information Source. Migration Policy Institute, Washington D.C.

O'Neil, K. (2003) – Summary Report: "Discussion on Migration and Development: Using Remittances and Circular Migration as Drivers for Development". Migration Policy Institute, Washington D.C.

Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. (2002) – "Working for a Solution through Europe. Kurdish Political Lobbying in Germany". In New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home, edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 186 – 202.

Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003) – "International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes." In International Migration and Sending Countries. Perceptions, Policies

and Transnational Relations, edited by E. Ostergaard-Nielsen. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3 - 33.

Pellegrino, A. (2001) – "Trends in Latin American Skilled Migration: 'Brain Drain' or 'Brain Exchange'?" In International Migration 39: 111 - 132.

Portes, A.; Haller, W. J.; Guarnizo, L. E. (2002) – "Transnational Entrepreneurs: An Alternative Form of Immigrant Economic Adaptation". In American Sociological Review 67: 278 - 298.

Pribilski, J. (2004) – "'Apredemos a convivir': Conjugal Relations, Co-parenting, and Family Life among Ecuadorian Transnational Migrants in New York City and the Ecuadorian Andes". In Global Networks 4: 313 - 334.

Radtke, K. (2003) – "Diaspora und Konfliktfinanzierung: Die moralische Ökonomie des Bürgerkrieges in Sri Lanka". In "Wenn es in der Heimat um Krieg und Frieden geht". Die Rolle der Diaspora in Krisenentwicklung und ziviler Konfliktberatung. Dokumentation einer Tagung der Loccumer Protokolle 70/03, edited by Jörg Calließ. Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, pp. 245 – 263.

Röben, B. (2004) – "Afghanische Diaspora – 'wichtige Größe' in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit". In Zeitschrift Entwicklungspolitik 17/2004.

Safran, W. (1991) – "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return". In Diaspora 1: 83 - 99.

Sawi, A. (2005) – "Egypt: the Political and Social Dimension of Migration". In Mediterranean Migration Report, edited by P. Fargues. Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, pp. 105 - 109.

Schetter, C. (2004) – "Kleine Geschichte Afghanistans". München.

Schmidt-Fink, E. (2001) – "Ausländer in Deutschland". In Isoplan 17(2).

Sheffer, G. (Ed.) (1986a) – "Modern Diasporas in International Politics". New York: St. Martin's Press.

Sheffer, G. (1986b) – "Political Aspects of Jewish Fundraising for Israel". In Modern Diasporas in International Politics, edited by Gabriel Sheffer. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 258 – 294.

Sheffer, G. (2003) – "Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simeunovic, D. (1997) – "Migration und sozioökonomische Transformation in Jugoslawien/Serbien". In Migration und sozioökonomische Transformation in Südosteuropa, edited by W. Heller. München: Südosteuropa-Ges. 59, 283 - 295.

Skrbis', Z. (2000) – "Long-distance Nationalism. Diasporas, Homelands and Identities". Aldershot: Ashgate.

Smith, R. C. (2003) – "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and the Exrtra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics". In International Migration Review 37: 297 - 344.

Smith, R. C. (1998) – "Transnational Localities: Community, Technology and the Politics of Membership within the Context of Mexico and U.S. Migration". In Transnationalism from Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 196 – 241.

Steinbeis, M. (2001) – "Größte Afghanen-Gemeinde Europas lebt in Hamburg". In Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf 12 Oct. 2001.

Stichweh, R (2000) – "Soziologie des Vereins. Strukturbildung zwischen Lokalität und Globalität". In Organisierte Privatinteressen. Vereine in Österreich, edited by Emil Brix and Rudolf Richter. Wien: Passagen Verlag, pp. 19-31.

Straubhaar, T.; Vadean, F. (2006) – "International Migrant Remittances and their Role in Development". In International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2005.

Stroux, S. (2002) – "Afghanische Teppichhändler in der Hamburger Speicherstadt". In Ethnoscripts 4/2002 (1).

Tietjens, H. (2002) – "Rückkehrerprojekte für in Deutschland lebende Afghanen/-innen im Bereich der Erwachsenenbildung". Institut für internationale Zusammenarbeit des Deutschen Volkshochschulverbandes (IIZ/DVV). Institut für international und interkulturell vergleichende Erziehungswissenschaft, Arbeitsbereich Interkulturelle Bildungsforschung der Universität Hamburg.

Van Hear, N. (2002) – "From 'Durable Solution' to Transnational Relations. Home and Exile among Refugee Diasporas". Centre for Development Research Copenhagen, CDR-Working Paper 02.9.

Vertovec, S. (2005) – "The Political Importance of Diasporas". Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford. Working paper 13.

Wayland, S. (2004) – "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora". In Review of International Studies 30: 405 - 426.

Weber, M. (1972) – Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. (5th ed.) Tübingen: Mohr.

The World Bank (2004) – "The Financial Sector in Afghanistan, South Asia Finance and Private Sector Unit". Washington, D.C.

The World Bank (2005) – "Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration". International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

The World Bank (2005) – "The Investment Climate in Afghanistan, South Asia Finance and Private Sector Unit". Washington D.C.

Wimmer, A.; Glick-Schiller, N. (2003) – “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology.” In International Migration Review 37: 576 - 611.

Zamani, S. (1998) – “Afghanen in Berlin”. Afghanisches Kommunikations- und Kulturzentrum e.V.

Zohry, A. (2003) – “Contemporary Egyptian Migration 2003”. Italia Cooperation and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Zohry, A.; Harrell-Bond, B. (2003) – “Contemporary Egyptian Migration: An Overview of Voluntary and Forced Migration”. Brighton, Working paper, C3, American University of Cairo, Development Research Center on Migration, Globalization and Poverty: 72.

Zulfacar, M. (1998) – “Afghan Immigrants in the USA and Germany: a Comparative Analysis of the Use of Ethnic Social Capital”. Münster.

HWWI Research Papers
by the HWWI Research Programme „Migration – Migration Research Group“

4. Arbeitsmarkt und Migration – eine empirische Analyse der Lohn- und Beschäftigungseffekte der Zuwanderung in Deutschland
   Max Steinhardt
   Hamburg, November 2006

3. Peer Effects, Social Multipliers and Migration at School: An International Comparison
   Horst Entorf, Martina Lauk
   Hamburg, July 2006

2. The Impact of Student Diversity in Secondary Schools. An Analysis of the International PISA Data and Implications for the German Education System
   Katharina Michaelowa, Jean Bourdon
   Hamburg, July 2006

1. Migration and Innovation. Does Cultural Diversity Matter for Regional R&D Activity?
   Annekatrin Niebuhr
   Hamburg, July 2006

The **Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)** is an independent economic research institute, based on a non-profit public-private partnership, which was founded in 2005. The University of Hamburg and the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce are shareholders in the Institute .

The HWWI's main goals are to:

- Promote economic sciences in research and teaching;
- Conduct high-quality economic research;
- Transfer and disseminate economic knowledge to policy makers, stakeholders and the general public.

The HWWI carries out interdisciplinary research activities in the context of the following research programmes: Economic Trends and Hamburg, International Trade and Development, Migration Research and International Climate Policy.

Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)

Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 | 20354 Hamburg | Germany
Phone +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 0 | Fax +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 76
info@hwwi.org | www.hwwi.org